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A growing body of work suggests that narrative comprehension involves the simulation of the 
events and actions described in a narrative (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Matlock, 2004). Preliterate 
children‟s ability to simulate a narrative character‟s movements is explored here in three studies. 
Children‟s simulations of a character‟s movements were found to be constrained by their 
expectation of the duration of the described activities (i.e., walking vs. driving) and by their 
expectations about the motivating influence of certain psychological factors (i.e., character being 
eager or not eager to get to a location). Using a novel methodology these findings reveal an 
ability among preliterate children to create impressively rich and dynamic mental representations 
of narrative events and address. The implications of the present investigation speak to the larger 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
The ability to create and comprehend stories is a remarkable feature of the human mind.   As 
the following passage, written by the famous French writer Gustave Flaubert (1857, p. 96-97), so 
strikingly illustrates, reading a story affords us the privilege of experiencing the perspective of 
another person, place, or time. 
Without leaving your chair you stroll through imagined landscapes 
as if they were real, and your thoughts interweave with the story, 
lingering over details or leaping ahead with the plot. Your 
imagination confuses itself with the characters, and it seems as if it 
were your own heart beating inside their clothes.  
And indeed, research indicates that during story comprehension, readers and listeners often 
behave as if they are embedded in the narrative situation, tracking and adopting a character‟s 
spatial, temporal, and psychological perspective (e.g., Black, Turner, & Bower, 1979; Bower & 
Morrow, 1990; Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992; Gerrig, 1993; Morrow, Bower, & 
Greenspan, 1989; Özyürek & Trabasso, 1997; Tapiero, 2007; Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Zwaan, 
1999a). But how is it that comprehenders, be they readers or listeners, track and adopt these 
perspectives? Findings suggest that, in addition to a representation of the surface structure of 
narratives (e.g., words, sentences), narrative comprehension also involves the creation of a mental 
representation of the situation, known as a situation model (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kintsch, 
1998; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).  Situation models are quite detailed and contain information 
about the time, space, entities, intentionality, and causal relations of the events and actions 
described in a narrative (for review see Zwaan 1999a).  
Recent findings suggest that situation models of narratives are also dynamic and rest on our 
ability to mentally simulate the events described in a narrative (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008). Mental 





states acquired during interaction with the world, body, and mind” (Barsalou, 2008, p. 618), have 
revolutionized our understanding of not only narrative comprehension, but, more generally, 
language comprehension as well. With respect to language comprehension, it has also been 
proposed that “any transformation the referent undergoes should cause an analogous 
transformation in the simulation” (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001, p. 153; Barsalou, 1999). And indeed, 
numerous studies demonstrate that adults routinely simulate the perceptual and motor information 
described in a text (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, Augustyn, & Taylor, 2009; 
Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Matlock, 2004; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; 
Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan & Madden, 2005; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 
2002). For example, in one study, readers took longer to read the sentence “Road 49 crosses the 
desert” when they were told earlier that the desert was 400 miles in diameter than when they were 
told the desert was only 30 miles in diameter (Matlock, 2004). These and similar types of findings, 
which will be reviewed in more detail in the pages to follow, suggest that language comprehension 
involves the simulation of the described situations and events.  
Simulations have been observed at all levels of language comprehension including word, 
sentence, and narrative comprehension. Little, however, is known about the developmental nature 
of this ability, especially as it pertains to the comprehension of narratives. Considerably more 
research has explored the simulation of textual information in adults than in children, leaving us 
with a better understanding of these processes in adults. It is not yet clear whether children also 
simulate narrative events - and if so, when this ability develops. Consequently, the aim of the 
present investigation was to explore young children‟s ability to simulate narrative events. 





young children simulate a narrative character‟s spatio-temporal perspective and specifically, a 
character‟s movements.  
This chapter consists of an introduction to the study of narrative, followed by an introduction 
to the mental processes involved in narrative comprehension in both adults and children. Chapter 1 
also provides a summary of the experiments reported in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Finally, Chapter 5 
summarizes the findings and integrates them into a framework for understanding the role of mental 
simulation in narrative comprehension.  Chapter 5 also discusses some caveats and future 
directions. 
 
A Brief Introduction to the Study and History of Narrative 
…narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; 
it begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor 
has been a people without narrative… narrative is international, 
transhistorical, transcultural; it is simply there, like life itself. 
(Barthes, 1982, p. 251-2; also see Young & Saver, 2001) 
As the above passage suggests, humans have been telling and listening to stories for quite some 
time. Scholars believe that humans began telling stories sometime between 30,000 and 100,000 
years ago, during our hunting-and-gathering past. These estimates place the emergence of 
storytelling prior to the emergence of other forms of symbolic expression (e.g., cave paintings, 
figurines, and engravings found on bones and antlers) but after the emergence of language (i.e., 
before Homo sapiens began migrating out of Africa; Sugiyama, 2001a). These estimates indicate 






Storytelling is an important and universal component of people‟s daily lives. Research 
indicates that narrative plays a critical role in many aspects of our social and cognitive functioning, 
influencing our social skills, attitudes, thoughts, memories, sense of self, and even our sense of 
time (Abbott, 2002; Dunbar, 1996; Hsu, 2008; Sugiyama, 2001a, 2001b). No special education is 
required to develop the ability to understand narratives and indeed all typically developing humans 
acquire the ability to create and comprehend stories. The universal presence of this remarkable trait 
has led some to rank it along with language as the distinctive human trait (Abbott, 2002).   
 
Defining Narrative  
To study and explore a particular topic, one must of course define and set clear boundaries 
around the phenomenon of interest. Historically, the definition of the term narrative has been 
widely debated (e.g., for review see Abbott, 2002; Mar & Oatley, 2008; Zunshine, 2006).  
Attempts to categorically define narratives have been notoriously difficult, as many categorical 
statements have often been countered with exceptions (Mar & Oatley, 2008). Even a definition as 
clear-cut as Aristotle‟s (330 BCE/1987) - a story should consist of a beginning, a middle, and an 
end - has been undermined by Edgar Allen Poe‟s (1846/1967) story, A Cask of Amontillado, which 
consists mostly of an end, no beginning, and a condensed middle. 
Most definitions of narrative have emphasized its structure.  The characterization of narrative 
as “the representation of an event or a series of events” is perhaps the simplest (Abbott, 2002, p. 
12). The critical term in this definition is “event”- a description pertaining to an action. According 
to Abbott, without action, there is no story. For example, The cow has fleas, is considered a 





Although a one event description is enough to satisfy Abbott, other scholars have argued that one 
event is insufficient, and that at least two events are needed to constitute a narrative and that the 
events need to be casually linked (e.g., Barthes, 1982; Rimmon-Kenan, 1983). Bordwell and 
Thompson (2003) add the element of time to their definition of narrative, which they assert is “a 
chain of events in a cause-effect relationship occurring in time.” Others argue that narratives must 
contain human agents, making the action of the narrative goal-oriented (e.g., Van Peer & Chatman, 
2001), while Black and Bower (1980) assert that the essence of a story lies in its description of 
problems and characters‟ plans for solving them.   
A definition of narrative as a description of causally linked events unfolding over time has 
been useful in examining the mental processes involved in the narrative comprehension. This is the 
definition that best captures the stories used in the present investigation of children‟s ability to 
simulate narrative events (see Appendices A, B, and C).  
 
Functions of Narrative 
Much has been written about the general function of narrative and its importance to our 
species (e.g., Hogan, 2003; Sugiyama, 2001a, 2001b). The origin of the English term “narrative” is 
intriguing and may also shed light on some of the more general functions of narrative. The word 
“narrative” originates from the Sanskrit word “gna”, a root word meaning “know”, which was 
passed down to us through the Latin words “gnarus” (“knowing”) and “narro” (“telling”; White, 
1987). Consequently, the narrative scholar, Porter Abbott (2002), has argued that “narrative” is a 
“universal tool for knowing as well as telling, for absorbing knowledge as well as expressing it” 





(2002) has also argued that a narrative is an “instrument that provokes active thinking” (p. 11).  It 
is this “active thinking” component of narrative that makes it an especially interesting topic of 
study.  
 The universality of narrative content has led many researchers to speculate about narrative‟s 
general function (e.g., Hogan, 2003; Sugiyama, 2001a, 2001b).  Interesting thematic similarities 
have been observed in a variety of stories found in a number of distinct cultures (Hogan, 2003).  
For example, many of the world‟s stories survey themes associated with the interactions of 
autonomous intentional agents (e.g., Palmer, 2004). One very familiar and often reoccurring theme 
explores the characteristics and implications associated with evil stepmothers. The Cinderella story 
features one especially memorable stepmother. Versions of this story have been found in such 
diverse cultures as ancient Egypt, ninth-century China, a number of Native South American 
cultures, and Europe (Gough, 1990; Sugiyama, 2001b). The universality of human relation themes 
has led some scholars to argue that listening and reading stories improves our social and social 
cognitive skills (Mar & Oatley, 2008; Zunshine, 2006).   
However, not all popular stories deal exclusively with human relations suggesting that the 
notion of stories as a means of improving social skills is partial at best. Indeed, other scholars have 
argued that the function of stories is not just limited to the social realm but rather to the 
improvement of any skills that may increase our chances of survival (Sugiyama, 2001a, 2001b). 
And indeed, findings suggest that other commonly reoccurring narrative themes feature important 
aspects of peoples‟ environments such as cosmology, topography, animal and plant characteristics, 






The Psychology of Narrative Comprehension 
How does the human mind comprehend stories? The following section explores and reviews 
what is known to date about the mental processes involved in the comprehension of narratives, and 
especially what is known about how human minds simulate the perspective of a person, place, or 
time in a narrative.  This review is presented in three subsections: (a) Situation Models; (b) 
Children‟s Situation Models; (c) Embodiment and Narrative Comprehension.  
 
Situation Models  
Contemporary models of narrative comprehension assert that comprehension consists of a 
number of different processes that occur in parallel as people read or listen to a story (Therriault & 
Rinck, 2007). According to these theories, comprehension involves at least three levels of 
representation: the surface structure, the textbase, and the situation model (Gernsbacher, 1990; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kintsch, 1988, 1998; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan, Langston, & 
Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Each level of representation deals with a different 
aspect of text comprehension; however, all three are interconnected in memory. The surface 
structure is a representation of the exact form of a text including its wording and syntactic 
structure. The textbase is a representation of a text‟s meaning. The final level is referred to as a 
situation or mental model (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). It is the situation model level of 
representation that is the main focus of the present investigation. 
Situation models are conceptualized as a representation of the situation described in the text, 
created when the reader or listener integrates textual information with their own world knowledge 
(e.g., Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). The construction of a “coherent situation model is tantamount 





“sets the parameters of space and time that are going to pervade the activities during the whole 
story” (Rinck, 2008, p. 360). Situation models impact and influence the reader and listener, 
especially their inferences, interpretations, and evaluations of incoming statements of the story.  
But, why study situation/mental models? I believe Bower and Morrow offer one very 
compelling explanation in their 1990 Science article:  
The principles readers use to explain and understand the actions of 
storybook characters are much the same as those they use to 
understand people's actions in everyday life. We build mental 
models that represent significant aspects of our physical and social 
world, and we manipulate elements of those models when we think, 
plan, and try to explain events of that world. The ability to construct 
and manipulate valid models of reality provides humans with our 
distinctive adaptive advantage; it must be considered one of the 
crowning achievements of the human intellect. (p. 247) 
A Brief History of the Study of Situation Models 
Text-comprehension researchers have been exploring the nature and interaction of the mental 
processes involved in the creation of a coherent situation model for almost 30 years. However, 
compared to other aspects of comprehension, the study of situation models is actually a relative 
“latecomer” (Kintsch, 2007, p. xv). Researchers began exploring situation models in earnest during 
the 1980s.  Prior to the 1980s, text comprehension researchers focused their efforts on examining 
readers‟ representation of the linguistic input, such as the surface structure and semantic meaning 
of a text.  This change in research focus was inspired by the publication of books by Johnson-Laird 
(1983) and van Dijk & Kintsch (1983). Motivated by developments in linguistics and philosophy, 
both works focused on the notion of language comprehension as more than just a representation of 
linguistic input. All three authors argued that the essence of language comprehension is to create a 





the term mental models to refer to these representations, whereas van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) used 
the term situation models.  Today, the term situation model is more often used to refer to a mental 
representation of a text, whereas, the term mental model tends to refer to a variety of different 
cognitive processes including, but not limited to, the comprehension of textual information (e.g., 
mental model of a town‟s spatial layout; Kintsch, 2007).  
The notion of language comprehension as a process of creating a mental representation of a 
described situation has had a profound impact on text comprehension research.  As Zwaan and 
Radvansky (1998) have pointed out, the introduction of the concept of situation models has 
changed the main research question posed by text-comprehension researchers from “How do 
readers comprehend a text?” to the more focused “How do readers construct a coherent situation 
model?” Thus, rather than simply asking how comprehenders are influenced by the structure of the 
text itself, the alternative question focuses on how readers are influenced by the situation described 
in the text. 
In the processes of uncovering the answer to this question, researchers have found that readers 
employ a variety of cognitive processes to construct a situation model of narratives. These include 
memory based processes (Gerrig & O‟Brien, 2005; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1998) as well as conscious 
intentional and strategic processes (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; 
Lorch & van den Broek, 1997; also see Rapp & van den Broek, 2005; van den Broek, Rapp, & 
Kendeou, 2005). For example, readers‟ situation models of stories influence the types of inferences 
readers make about a story‟s spatial layout (Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987), and a character‟s 
goal-based intentions (Trabasso & Wiley, 2005). Readers appear to monitor many different aspects 





processes work together to create a situation model has spurred the creation of many different 
models of text comprehension (See Table 1 for a summary of models, pp. 20-22; also see Mar, 
2004). 
Briefly, one of the most influential theories of text comprehension has been Kintsch and van 
Dijk‟s (1978) Interactive Model of Comprehension, which outlined the process of reading from 
word recognition through to the creation of a mental representation of a text‟s meaning. Kintsch 
(1988, 1998) extended this theory into another very influential model, the Construction-Integration 
Model, explored further in Table 1. Kintsch‟s models have served as a foundational point for many 
other theories of text comprehension. Theories of text comprehension have continued to evolve 
and in recent years have undergone considerable transformations.   
Two of today‟s most prominent models, the Event-Indexing Model (Zwaan, et al., 1995) and 
the Immersed Experiencer Framework (Zwaan, 2004), were developed by Zwaan and colleagues. 
The Event-Indexing Model (Zwaan et al., 1995) drew attention to the different dimensions of 
narratives tracked by comprehenders, and how readers and listeners experience the perspective of 
another person, place, or time. This focus is closest to that of the present investigation. 
Consequently, the Event-Indexing Model is described in more detail below, while a description of 
the Immersed Experiencer Framework (Zwaan, 2004) can be found later in this chapter in the 





Table 1: Models of Text Comprehension 
 
Name of Model Authors Publication 
Year 
General Overview of Model 







1978 Text comprehension proceeds in cycles. 
 
A few propositions are processed in every 
cycle and connected to existing ones. 
 
Situation models are needed because they (1) 
integrate information across sentences, (2) 
explain similarities in comprehension 
performance across modalities, (3) account for 
domain expertise on comprehension, (4) 
explain translation, (5) explain how people 
learn about a domain from multiple sources. 
 
    
Construction-
Integration Model  
 
Kintsch 1988 Focuses on importance of inferences in 
maintaining a coherent model. 
 
During reading, readers construct a coherent 
network of explicit text propositions, thematic 
generalizations and coherence preserving 
inferences. 
 
Incoming information is integrated into model. 
During integration, activation builds up in 
highly interconnected elements of the model. 
 




Gernsbacher 1990 Focuses on the importance of building a 
coherent mental representation or "structure" 
of the information being comprehended 
 
Readers:  (1) build a foundation for 
representing new information, (2) map new 
information onto previously established related 
information, and (3) shift and create new 
foundations when incoming information is not 







Name of Model Authors Publication 
Year 
General Overview of Model 
    
Minimalist Model McKoon & 
Radcliff 
1992 Focuses on memory processes that support 
comprehension at the local level. 
 
Memory-based and minimalist model. 
 
Defers to constructionist theories model for comments 
on more global processing. 
    
Capacity 
Constraint 




1992 Shares general theoretical framework with Kintsch 
and van Dijk’s model (1978), but focuses directly on 
the processes of comprehension as they occur (e.g., 
on-line reading processes). 
 
Encouraged the use of eye-tracking methodologies. 







1994 Focuses on inferences need to create a coherent 
causal situation model. 
 
Assumes that readers monitor coherence of model 
and routinely seek explanations for text outcomes. 
 
Comprehension does not need proceed from lower to 
higher level of representation (e.g., surface form to 
situation model). 
 
Causal situation models consist of interconnected 
networks of textual events. 







1995 Focuses on the multi-dimensional aspects of situation 
models. Claims that narrative events are split into five 
dimensions: time, space, causes, motivations, and 
person/object.  
 
Focuses on how incoming information is processed 
and represented in the long-term memory. 
 
Narrative events are represented in a network of 
nodes. The nodes are linked with each other through 
situational links according to the indexes they share. 
Claims that it is easier to integrate a new incoming 
event if it shares indexes with a previous event.  
 







Name of Model Authors Publication 
Year 
General Overview of Model 




Integration Model  
 
Goldman, 
Varma, & Coté 
1996 Focuses on the ways in which readers’ limited 
working memory capacity influences 
comprehension.  
 
Uses computational architecture of the 
Capacity Constraint Reader Model (Just & 
Carpenter, 1992).  
 
Comprehension occurs in cycles in which 
certain textual elements become more or less 
active in working memory. 
 
    
Landscape Model  
 




1996 Focuses on the multi-dimensional aspects of 
situation models (like Zwaan et al., 1995). 
 
Similar to Construction–Integration Model. 
Views reading as cyclical process, in which 
propositions fluctuated in activation from cycle 
to cycle. 
 
Also, focuses on readers’ goals and judgments 
of coherence of representation.  
 





Zwaan  2004 Focuses on the notion that language 
comprehension involves action and perceptual 
representations and not amodal propositions.  
 
Comprehension consists of three components:  
activation, construal, and integration. Activation 
works at the word level, construal at the clause 







The Event-Indexing model revolutionized the study of narrative comprehension by focusing 
research efforts on the multidimensional aspects of situation models and how these different 
dimensions operate together during the construction and maintenance of a coherent situation 
model. Although today situation models are, by definition, considered multidimensional (Rinck, 
2008), when developing the Event-Indexing model Zwaan and Radvansky (1998) argued that even 
though previous work (e.g., Trabasso & Magliano, 1996; Trabasso & Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & 
Suh, 1993; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985) had established that causal relations play a critical 
role in the creation of a coherent situation model, the work overlooked compelling evidence that 
comprehenders also track other aspects of narrative events, such as time, space, and protagonists.  
According to the Event-Indexing model, during comprehension clauses are parsed into events. 
These event representations are then integrated into the situation model and into long-term 
memory, resulting in a coherent situation model. As supported by years of subsequent research, 
five different dimensions of the events and actions described in a narrative are routinely tracked by 
comprehenders and incorporated into a situation model: (1) person/object, (2) motivation, (3) 
spatial, (4) temporal, and (5) causal aspects. For example, with respect to the person/object 
dimension, research indicates that readers make numerous inferences about characters‟ personal 
characteristics.  When presented with the sentence, The electrician examined the lighting fitting, 
readers were slower to read the sentences, She took out her screwdriver, than the sentence, He took 
out his screwdriver (Carreiras, Garnham, Oakhill, & Cain, 1996).  This finding suggests that 
readers are quick to make inferences about the gender of characters and that these inferences tend 
to be driven by stereotypes, such as that electricians are typically male. Furthermore, these 





2007). For example, given that causes temporally precede effects, representations of the temporal 
and causal dimensions of narrative are often closely linked. Thus, rather than explicitly focusing on 
the role of perspective, the Event-Indexing Model revolutionized the study of narrative 
comprehension by focusing on how readers track and incorporate these five dimensions into their 
situation models. The results of the studies most pertinent to the present investigation are described 
in the following section. 
 
Perspective in Narrative 
 If we are told in the early pages of a story that it is a rainy night, 
and if the descriptions have set us inside a drafty house, then we 
naturally inhabit that context. Having brought a setting to life in our 
imaginations, and having invested it with the tones and shadings 
that are uniquely our own, we sustain it… We work hard to 
establish the image, and then move our attention elsewhere; the 
image becomes part of the context through which we filter what we 
read. (Birkerts, 1994, p. 225-266 in Van Peer & Chatman, 2001)  
The importance of perspective in narrative has been lauded and extensively studied by both 
cognitive and literary scholars alike.  It has even been argued that the fundamental function of 
narrative is “not to report a chronological sequence of events, but to signal a perspective on events 
. .” (Gee, 1991, p. 20).  Bruner (1986) has argued that narratives “must depend on forms of 
discourse that recruit the reader‟s imagination” such as subjectification which he defines as the 
“depiction of reality, not through an omniscient eye that views a timeless reality, but through the 
filter of the consciousness of the protagonists in the story . . .” (p. 25).   
In narrative, perspective is associated with the “deictic centre” (Duchan, Bruder, & Hewitt, 
1995) or the “here/now” point (Morrow, Greenspan, & Bower, 1987), which typically refers to the 





Generally, it is believed that tracking and adopting a character‟s perspective enhances 
comprehension by allowing a reader to focus their limited attentional resources on the most salient 
aspect of a story, the character (e.g., Bower & Morrow, 1990; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). It has 
also been argued that perspective serves as a tool by which readers organize information presented 
in a text (MacWhinney, 2005; Zwaan, 2004). 
Given that situation models are created from a particular perspective, usually the 
protagonist‟s, text-comprehension researchers have for some time been interested in how narrative 
perspectives influence the comprehension of narratives. And indeed, both readers‟ and listeners‟ 
ability to track and share narrative perspectives has been one of the most extensively investigated 
aspects of situation models, and narrative cognition more generally (e.g., Black et al., 1979; Bower 
& Morrow, 1990; Dijkstra, Zwaan, Graesser, & Magliano, 1995; Gernsbacher et al., 1992; 
Graesser et al., 1994; Morrow et al., 1989; Morrow et al., 1987; Özyürek & Trabasso, 1997; 
Tapiero, 2007; Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Van Peer & Chatman, 2001; Zwaan, 1999a, 1999b). 
Overall, studies indicate that adopting a narrative perspective influences comprehension and 
situation models in a number of ways. First, adopting a protagonist‟s perspective activates 
information about this character‟s thoughts, emotions, or goals, making this information more 
highly accessible. Second, switching perspectives may slow comprehension. Third, perspective-
taking influences the reader‟s response to the narrative including the reader‟s causal and emotional 
inferences.   
The following summary, which focuses on adult readers‟ abilities to track and adopt a 
narrative character‟s perspective, is presented in three subheadings: Psychological Perspective-





on children‟s ability to adopt a narrative character‟s perspective is discussed in the following 
section entitled Children’s Situation Models.  
 
Psychological Perspective-taking  
Narrators are viewed as telling a story from the perspective of the main character, and 
similarly readers are viewed as focusing attention on the protagonist, whose actions determine the 
“here and now” point (Bower & Morrow, 1990, p. 45) in the narrative.  It has been argued that 
“one prerequisite of comprehension is that readers keep track of their knowledge of the story world 
(privileged knowledge) coupled with the various mental states of characters described in the story” 
(Therriault & Rinck, 2007, p. 232). And indeed, research indicates that readers‟ situation models of 
narratives include representations of characters‟ mental or psychological perspectives.  The most 
commonly investigated aspects of a character‟s psychological perspective include emotions and 
goals (e.g., Dijkstra et al., 1995; de Vega, Diaz, & León, 1997; Gernsbacher et al., 1992; 
Kneepkens & Zwaan, 1994; Oatley, 1994; Zwaan, 1999a). In one frequently cited study of 
emotional perspective-taking during narrative comprehension, subjects read narratives about a 
character engaging in an emotionally significant activity (e.g., character steals money from a store 
where his best friend works and later learns that his friend had been fired; Gernsbacher et al., 
1992). After reading each narrative, readers read aloud matching emotion words (e.g., shame) and 
mismatching ones (e.g., pride). Mismatching emotion words were read more slowly suggesting 
that readers track and adopt characters‟ psychological perspectives during comprehension, 
suggesting that readers‟ were actively drawing inferences about the characteristics of the characters 





Research also indicates that readers keep track of the main character‟s goals (Lutz & 
Radvansky, 1997; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Suh, 1993). For example, researchers have 
found that readers are faster to recognize goals that have not yet been accomplished by a 
protagonist than goals that have just been accomplished, presumably because unaccomplished 
goals are more active and relevant in the character‟s mind (Lutz & Radvansky, 1997; Trabasso & 
Suh, 1993). When readers were presented with a sentence such as David is attempting to submit his 
chapter in a timely manner, they stored and maintained in memory David‟s goal to submit the 
chapter until David was removed from the focus of the text or until the goal had been 
accomplished. Evidence suggests that objects relevant to main character‟s current goals remain 
highly accessible, while objects that are relevant to a completed goal become less accessible over 
time, and objects that are relevant to a postponed goal are inhibited almost immediately (Rinck & 
Bower, 2004). 
 
Spatial Perspective-taking  
The most widely studied dimension of situation models has been the spatial dimension, which 
generally includes a mental map of the places, landmarks, and objects described in the narrative, as 
well as the locations and movements of the characters. Generally, research suggests that when 
people read a narrative, they focus on the spatial aspects of the main character‟s perspective and 
"move with" the character through the narrative setting, making locations closer to the protagonist 
more accessible (e.g., Bower & Morrow, 1990; Morrow et al., 1987; Rinck & Bower, 2004).  
Several different approaches have been used to study spatial aspects of situation models. In 





often includes the location of different rooms and objects.  Participants are then presented with a 
story set in a location depicted on the map. Findings indicate that a narrative character‟s current 
location influences participants‟ judgment times about various locations and objects in the setting 
(Morrow et al., 1987). For example, objects that are closer to the protagonist are more active and 
more available for reference in readers‟ minds than objects that are further away from the 
protagonist (e.g., Glenberg et al., 1987; Morrow et al., 1987; Morrow et al, 1989; Rinck & Bower, 
1995; Wilson, Rinck, McNamara, Bower, & Morrow, 1993).  A narrative character‟s movement 
throughout a story can be thought of as a shifting „spot of light‟ moving over the corresponding 
parts of a reader's situation model (Bower & Morrow, 1990). 
Research indicates that readers track different spatial aspects of characters‟ thoughts.  In one 
such study (Morrow et al., 1989), participants read short narratives about a character moving 
through a building. Throughout the story, critical sentences located a character in a particular 
location (physical location), while the character thought about a different location (mental 
locations). Subsequently, when presented with a probe word, readers were faster to identify words 
denoting an object located in the character‟s mental location rather than physical location, 
suggesting that readers were tracking the character‟s thoughts about different locations.   
Finally, it should also be noted that, although the spatial dimension has been the most widely 
studied aspect of situation models, research indicates it is not the one most routinely tracked by 
readers. Studies of the dominance of particular situation model dimensions indicate that readers are 
most sensitive to the protagonist and time dimensions (Magliano, Miller, & Zwaan, 2001; Rich & 
Taylor, 2000; Rinck & Weber, 2003; Therriault, Rinck, & Zwaan, 2006; Zwaan, Magliano, & 






Time is a critical component of situation models and of special interest to the present 
investigation.  As many readers already know, stories take place in time. Some, such as Abbott 
(2002), have even argued that the principal purpose and “fundamental gift” of narrative is to 
organize our species‟ understanding of time (p. 3). Similarly, Ricoeur has stated that narrative “is 
meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal existence” (see Abbott, 2002, p. 
4).  With respect to the role time plays in situation models and narrative comprehension, Zwaan 
and Radvansky (1998) have argued that “to achieve a proper understanding of the situation 
described by a text, the reader needs to know when the described events took place both relative to 
each other and relative to the time at which they were narrated” (p. 175). Time is also the most 
linguistically explicit aspect of situation models, with temporal morphemes and time adverbials 
(e.g., “a few seconds ago”) specifying the temporal sequence of events described in a narrative 
(Zwaan & Singer, 2003).  
Research indicates that readers‟ situation models of narrative include representations of the 
temporal aspects of a narrative. Generally speaking, evidence suggests that readers spontaneously 
track temporal information during comprehension (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Using a probe-
word recognition task, Zwaan (1996) found that events that happened to a character more recently 
were more accessible to readers than events that happened less recently. In his study, adult 
participants read a story presented on a computer screen, one sentence at a time. At various points 
in the story, a probe word was displayed on the screen and readers were asked to decide if that 
word had appeared in the story. Zwaan found that the time readers took to respond to the probe 





was less accessible (i.e., read more slowly) to readers after reading the sentence, An hour ago, John 
entered the building, than after reading the sentence, A moment ago, John entered the building 
(Zwaan, 1996). Just as in real life, events that happened more recently were more accessible to the 
reader than events that happened less recently. These findings suggest that readers are prone to 
interpret narrative time in the same terms typically used to interpret events in real life. In addition, 
the results of this study demonstrate that readers‟ situation models of narratives contain important 
temporal information.  
Time, however, has also been the least investigated aspect of situation models. Therriault and 
Raney (2007) have recently acknowledged that, “although we are certainly making progress, there 
is still much that we do not understand about how readers process and represent time in discourse” 
(p.174).  As they point out, part of the reason why time has received so little attention from 
cognitive psychologists may be due to the difficulty in defining time. With respect to narrative, 
time may refer to duration, simultaneity, order, temporal perspective, and socially constructed units 
of time.  Identifying which aspects of time readers routinely process during reading comprehension 
is important if we are to better understand the complexities involved in reading (Therriault & 
Raney, 2007). Given that children‟s representation of, not just time, but specifically the duration of 
a narrative character‟s movement is the primary focus of the present studies, our current 
understanding of readers‟ representation of time and especially duration warrants a closer 
examination. 
Duration, or “our ability to represent the relative time course of some events”, is a 
fundamental aspect of temporal processing (Therriault & Raney, 2007, p. 174).  Duration has 





addressed at all in studies exploring children‟s situation models of narratives. Although few studies 
have focused exclusively on duration, the results of these studies provide some evidence that adult 
readers represent duration information during text-comprehension. Duration has been explored in 
combination with other aspects of situations (Rich & Taylor, 2000), such as characters‟ goals 
(Anderson, Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; Magliano & Schleich, 2000; Singer & Richards, 2005), as 
well as other aspects of time (Rinck, Hahnel, & Becker, 2001; Rinck, Gámez, Díaz, & de Vega, 
2003).  For example, Rinck et al. (2001) examined how readers process inconsistent temporal 
sequence information. An example of a temporally inconsistent passage used in Rinck et al.‟s 
(2001) study includes the following (p. 79): 
Today, Markus and Claudia would finally meet again. 
Markus‟s train arrived in Dresden on time at 4:10 p.m., and Claudia‟s 
train arrived at 4:30 p.m. 
Markus was very excited when his train stopped at Dresden Central 
Station just as scheduled. 
He tried to think of what he should say when he met her. 
Many people were crowding around the platform. 
Claudia was already waiting for him when he got off the train with his 
huge bag.  
 
Rinck et al. (2001) found that when presented with inconsistent temporal information (e.g., Claudia 
was waiting for Markus), readers‟ reading time increased compared to more consistent temporal 
information (e.g., Markus was waiting for Claudia). Reading time increased both when readers 
noticed and failed to notice the temporal inconsistencies. Rinck et al. (2001) argued that their 
findings demonstrate the readers track the temporal dimension of narratives during comprehension 
and situation model creation.  Therriault and Raney (2007) extended Rinck et al.‟s (2001) findings, 
demonstrating that readers attend to temporal information without the use of specific time terms 





explicitly and implicitly inconsistent event durations and that these inconsistencies affect 
comprehension.  
Overall, the results of studies exploring adults‟ situation models of narrative indicate that 
situation models of narrative are rich in detail and specific to the various perspectives described in 
a narrative.  
 
Children’s Narrative Comprehension and Situation Models 
Several aspects of young children‟s narrative comprehension have been quite extensively 
studied (for reviews see Perfetti, Landi, & Oakhill, 2005; and also Lynch et al., 2008; Milosky & 
Skarakis-Doyle, 2007; Paris & Paris, 2003). The majority of these studies have explored children‟s 
inference-making and comprehension monitoring.  Inferences are an important aspect of narrative 
comprehension and a critical component of situation models and as such, children‟s ability to make 
inferences is reviewed below in the subsection entitled Narrative Comprehension and Inferences. 
Children‟s ability to track and adopt a character‟s perspective, however, has received much less 
attention (Perfetti et al., 2005; Lynch et al., 2008). What is known about children‟s ability to track 
and adopt a character‟s perspective, especially as it pertains to the focus of the present 
investigation, is reviewed in the subsection entitled Perspective-Taking during Narrative 
Comprehension.   
Narrative Comprehension and Inferences 
During comprehension, comprehenders need to make numerous inferences bridging their own 
relevant world knowledge with the information provided in a narrative (e.g., Graesser et al., 1994; 





den Broek, 1990; Zwaan et al., 1995). Relevant background knowledge may include an 
understanding of the how one event can be motivated, psychologically or physically induced by 
another event (Lynch et al., 2008; Trabasso, van den Broek, & Suh, 1989). A failure to make 
appropriate inferences results in an incoherent situation model, leading to well documented 
comprehension failures (e.g., Cain & Oakhill, 2007).  
Evidence suggests that young children engage in some of the same inference-making 
processes as older children and adults.  Children as young as 6 years of age regularly make 
appropriate inferences concerning a character‟s goal (Lynch & van den Broek, 2007). Both adult 
and child comprehenders remember events that have more causal connections (e.g., Goldman & 
Varnhagen, 1986; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985; van den Broek, 1988; van den Broek, Lorch, 
& Thurlow, 1996).  Even children as young as 4 and 6 years of age were more likely to recall 
events that had more causal connections than events with fewer causal connections after watching 
Sesame Street videos, suggesting that preschoolers are sensitive to the causal structure of stories 
(van den Broek et al., 1996). Preschoolers‟ correct answers to questions pertaining to short stories 
reveal an understanding of the causal structure of narratives, as do the simple, yet causally 
coherent, narratives children tell by 5 years of age (Lynch et al., 2008; Stein, 1988; Trabasso & 
Nickels, 1992). Generally, younger children are able to make the same inferences as older children, 
but they may not always do so spontaneously, and often require prompting (Casteel & Simpson, 
1991). In summary, as evidenced by their ability to recall a narrative or answer basic questions, 
that preschoolers make important inferences, and track and encode causal connections to create at 





Perspective-Taking during Narrative Comprehension 
Only three studies to date have explored the details of children‟s situation models, and they 
have done so by investigating whether young children track and adopt a narrative character‟s 
perspective (O‟Neill & Shultis, 2007; Rall & Harris, 2000; Ziegler, Mitchell, & Currie, 2005).  
These studies have demonstrated that preschoolers‟ situation models of stories contain information 
about a character‟s spatial (Rall & Harris, 2000; Ziegler et al., 2005) and mental perspective 
(O‟Neill & Shultis, 2007) by about 4 years of age. Rall and Harris (2000) were the first to 
demonstrate that children, like adults (e.g., Black et al., 1979; Morrow et al., 1987), adopt a 
protagonist‟s spatial perspective. They asked children to listen to stories describing the activities of 
well-known fairytale characters. Each story used deictic verbs of motion to describe the 
movements of secondary characters. These verbs were either consistent (e.g., came) or inconsistent 
(e.g., went) with the protagonist‟s spatial perspective.  For example, children heard, “Cinderella 
was sitting on the chair by the fireplace, dreaming about the ball. Then her fairy godmother came 
(went) into the cottage.” When Rall and Harris (2000) asked 3- and 4-year-olds to recall sentences 
from the stories, they found that, like adults, children‟s accuracy in recalling the targeted deictic 
verbs of motion suffered when the verb of motion was inconsistent with the protagonist's spatial 
perspective (e.g., went), rather than when the verb of motion was consistent with the protagonist‟s 
perspective (e.g., came).  Like adults, children often made substitution errors, replacing an 
inconsistent motion verb with a consistent motion verb.  These findings suggest that while listening 
to a story, preschoolers adopt a character‟s spatial perspective.  
Using Rall and Harris‟ (2000) methodology, Ziegler et al. (2005) found that children not only 





perspective of unfamiliar, wicked, and even inanimate characters. More recently, O‟Neill and 
Shultis (2007) demonstrated that 4- and 5-year-olds but not 3-year-olds also track and adopt a 
character‟s mental perspective. Preschoolers listened to several short stories, each describing a 
character thinking about engaging in an activity in a location (e.g., playroom) different from the 
protagonist‟s current location (e.g., kitchen). While listening to each story (e.g., This is John’s 
house. This is the kitchen. This is the playroom beside the kitchen. Right now, John is in the 
kitchen. He wants to eat a snack. He is thinking of eating at the table in the playroom because the 
table in the kitchen is dirty.), children looked at two toy models of the locations described in the 
story.  Critically, both toy models contained an identical target object (e.g. the exact same table), 
located in the same location relative to the base of the model. After listening to each story, children 
were asked a test question containing an ambiguous referent (e.g., Can you point to the table?).  
O‟Neill and Shultis (2007) hypothesized that if children could adopt a character‟s mental 
perspective and track the protagonist‟s thoughts to the table in the playroom, they would point to 
the table in the playroom model and not the table in the kitchen model, and indeed, they did. Four- 
and five-year-olds pointed to the target object in the protagonist‟s mental goal location (e.g., table 
in playroom) 81% and 88% of the time, respectively. In contrast, 3-year-olds pointed to the target 
object in the protagonist‟s mental location only 62% of the time. Thus to date, findings suggest that 
preschoolers‟ situation models of stories contain information about a character‟s spatial (Rall & 
Harris, 2000; Ziegler et al., 2005), and mental perspective (O‟Neill & Shultis, 2007) by about 4 
years of age. 
As already revealed, findings indicate that adult readers track and a adopt a character‟s 





information about narrative characters‟ perspectives (e.g., Black et al., 1979; Bower & Morrow, 
1990; Bryant, Tversky, & Franklin, 1992; Gernsbacher et al., 1992; Morrow et al., 1989; Özyürek 
& Trabasso, 1997; Tapiero, 2007; Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Zwaan, 1999a). Although limited to the 
results of just three studies, findings also suggest that preschoolers‟ mental representations of 
stories contain substantial detail concerning a main character‟s spatial and mental perspective 
(O‟Neill & Shultis, 2007; Rall & Harris, 2000; Ziegler et al., 2005).  
 
Embodiment and Narrative Comprehension 
Many of the studies thus far reviewed pose a challenge to traditional, amodal accounts of 
situation models. This challenge has continued to gain support from a growing number of recent 
behavioural and neuropsychological studies, which have begun to shed light on the embodied 
nature of situation model. By demonstrating that situation models may indeed be modal (e.g., 
Zwaan, 2004) and not amodal as traditionally conceptualized (e.g., Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978), 
these findings have revolutionized our understanding of narrative comprehension, and language 
comprehension more generally.  This section will introduce both traditional and embodied 
arguments and summarize the key findings of both approaches.  
Traditional Approaches to Language Comprehension 
The traditional view of language comprehension, also known as a propositional, symbolic, or 
amodal view (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1984) was discussed, albeit briefly, in the section 
entitled Situation Models (e.g., Kintsch & Van Dijk‟s, 1978).  The general assumption of 





…the human mind is much like a bricklayer, or maybe a contractor, 
who puts together bricks to build structures. The malleable clay of 
perception is converted to the neat mental bricks we call words, and 
propositions, units of meaning, which can be used in a variety of 
structures. (Zwaan & Madden, 2005, p. 224) 
Thus, according to traditional views of language comprehension, comprehension is based on the 
creation and manipulation of amodal, abstract, and arbitrary symbols (e.g. AAA symbols; Fodor, 
2000; Newell, 1990). An amodal symbol or token (e.g., mental representation of coffee) is created 
when a percept (e.g., experience of drinking coffee) is stripped of sensory information, thus no 
longer bearing any systematic morphological relationship to the corresponding multimodal 
perceptual experience (e.g., actual act of drinking coffee). In addition, according to the traditional 
accounts of language comprehension words derive much of their meaning through their 
associations with other words (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008). This approach is evident in many 
early and computational theories of situation model constructions (e.g., See Table 1, p. 20-22). 
Furthermore, the majority of publications supporting the amodal account of language are not 
empirical but rather “computational in nature” (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008, p. 311). 
Motivated by an accumulating amount of empirical evidence suggesting that mental 
representations are rooted in brain systems involved in perception (e.g., vision, audition), action 
(e.g., movement, proprioception), and introspection (e.g., mental states, affect), numerous 
arguments have been put forth challenging the traditional or amodal view of language 
comprehension (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Gibbs, 2006; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Zwaan, 
1999b, 2004). For example, Zwaan (1999b) has pointed out that the sheer number of propositions 
needed to mentally represent the essential characteristics of a narrative situation (e.g., character‟s 





systems. Meanwhile, Barsalou (2008) had argued that amodal symbols were adopted as an 
explanation of many cognitive processes, not because of compelling empirical evidence, but 
“because they provided an elegant and powerful formalisms for representing knowledge, because 
they captured important intuitions about the symbolic character of cognition, and because they 
could be implemented in artificial intelligence” (p. 620). 
Review of Empirical Evidence Supporting an Embodied Approach to Language 
Comprehension 
As mentioned earlier, a growing number of studies have challenged the traditional view of 
language comprehension. The general finding of these studies is that readers appear to mentally 
simulate the perceptual, motor, and affective content of narratives (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Brunyé, et 
al., 2009; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Glenberg, 2007; Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007; Speer, 
Reynolds, Swallow, & Zacks, 2009; Zwaan, 2004). Research has also indicated that simulations 
are involved in all levels of language comprehension including word, sentence, and narrative 
comprehension (for review see Zwaan, 2004). The following section reviews three main avenues 
of research supporting this conclusion.  
First, comprehenders‟ eye and hand movements have been found to be consistent with 
perceiving or acting in the described situation (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Spivey, 
Richardson, Tyler, & Young, 2000). Klatzky, Pellegrino, McCloskey, and Doherty (1989) found 
that the comprehension of verbally described actions is facilitated when participants are allowed to 
first form their hand into a shape appropriate for the action (e.g., fingers pinched together when 
reading about throwing a dart). In another study, adult participants were observed to direct their 





Geng, 2001). While looking at a blank screen, participants listened to stories about spatial scenes. 
When the story described an object or activity on a lower floor of the building, participants‟ eye 
movements lingered on the lower portion of the screen. As the actions of the story “moved” up in 
the building, so did the participants eye movement on the blank screen.  
Second, word and sentence comprehension has been found to activate motor regions of the 
brain associated with the actions referred to by the word (e.g., Pulvermüller, 2001, 2005).  For 
example, Tettamanit et al. (2005), found that simply reading an action sentence (e.g., the boy 
kicked the ball) activated brain region associated with the actual actions (e.g., premotor areas 
involved in the kicking of a ball). Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller (2004) found similar results 
at the word comprehension level. In both studies, areas of activation in the premotor cortex were 
somatotopically organized.  Sentences about hand actions activated brain areas associated with 
hand actions, whereas, sentences about mouth actions activated brain areas associated with mouth 
actions, and sentences about leg actions activated brain areas associated with leg actions.  Research 
indicates that these activations are not simply the by-product of comprehension but rather an 
instrumental component of comprehension (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikolin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005). 
Similar results have been observed in a study using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), 
where it was found that participants made faster lexical decisions in response to words denoting 
arm or leg actions when arm or leg areas in the left hemisphere received TMS (Pulvermüller, et al., 
2005). TMS of arm area were also found to lead to faster responses to arm words and TMS of leg 
areas to faster responses to leg words.  
Third, word and sentence comprehension has been found to involve the activation of visual 





recognition and naming times when presented with pictures that match the implied perceptual 
orientation and shape of objects than when they mismatch (Zwaan, 2004; Stanfield & Zwaan, 
2001; Zwaan et al., 2002). For example, Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) presented adult readers with 
sentences that implied a particular orientation of an object (e.g., “John put the pencil in the 
drawer”) followed by a picture of the object (e.g., picture of pencil). Participants were asked to 
verify that a pencil had been mentioned in the previous sentence. Verification times were faster 
when the pencil in the picture matched the orientation implied in the sentence (e.g., horizontal) 
than when it did not match (e.g., vertical).  These types of findings suggest that adult readers 
construct sensorimotor simulations of the situations describe in the sentences. Other studies 
indicate that tasks that engage visuospatial processes disrupt the creation of coherent situation 
models, in comparison to tasks that engaged verbal memory (Fincher-Keifer, 2001; Fincher-Kiefer 
& D‟Agostino, 2004).  These findings suggest that the construction of situation models involves 
the simulation of the described situation.  
 
Embodied Theories of Language Comprehension 
Empirical evidence challenging a traditional conceptualization of language comprehension has 
inspired several recent theories of embodied language comprehension including Glenberg and 
Robertson‟s (1999) Indexical Hypothesis and Zwaan‟s (2004) Immersed Experiencer Framework. 
However, it must be noted that embodied theories of language comprehension and cognition are 
not entirely new; as Barsalou (2008) points out, “nearly all prescientific views of the human mind 
going to back to ancient philosophers (e.g., Epicurus 341–270 B.C.E./1987) assumed that modal 





current simulation views” (p. 619). What is new, however, is the compelling amount of empirical 
evidence supporting an embodied account of cognition and language comprehension.  
Generally, embodied theories of language comprehension “argue that language 
comprehension requires activation of our experiences with the world” (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 
2008, p. 309). Unlike traditional approaches to language comprehension, embodied approaches 
focus on the critical role mental simulations of textual information play in the representation of 
meaning (Barsalou, 2008). An embodied approach views language as a “sequence of stimuli that 
orchestrate the retrieval of experiential traces of people, places, objects, events, and actions” 
(Zwaan & Kaschak, 2009, p. 368). Experiential traces are created as one interacts with the world 
(e.g., drinks coffee). During these interactions, the brain captures states across the modalities (e.g., 
taste, smell), which are then integrated into a multimodal representation stored in memory. 
Multimodal representations can be reactivated at a later time (e.g., during thinking or reading about 
coffee) to create a simulation. In this way, simulations are “the re-enactment of perceptual, motor, 
and introspective states acquired during experience with the world, body, and mind” (Barsalou, 
2008, p. 618).  
Barsalou‟s (1999) Perceptual Symbols Systems Theory assumes that cognition and language 
comprehension are based on the activation and manipulation of perceptual symbols which are 
created during personal experiences. During an activity (e.g., drinking coffee), the brain records 
sensorimotor aspects of the experience. These combinations of the relevant neural states induced 
by the activity include multimodal information such as vision, hearing, touch, smell, taste, as well 
as proprioceptive, and kinaesthetic information.  Only some aspects of the activity are recorded, 





symbols are collected into a frame, forming the basis of simulations, which afford representation 
and motor control.  Essentially, according to the Perceptual Symbols Systems Theory,  frames  and  
simulations  are  abstractions that account for how experience becomes a memory  and how related  
structures  support  inferences,  categories,  and  concepts. 
The Indexical Hypothesis (IH) centers on sentence comprehension.  And like other embodied 
theories, IH proposes that an amodal account of language comprehension inadequately explains 
language comprehension. Instead, the IH focuses on the role of simulation and “asserts that the 
AAA symbols of language (i.e., words), become meaningful by simulating the content of 
sentences” (Glenberg, Gutierrez, Levin, Japuntich, & Kaschak, 2004, p. 425).  Three processes are 
involved in the simulation of sentences: indexing, affordances, and meshing. First, words and 
phrases are mapped or indexed to objects in the environment or to perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 
1999). This establishes the content of the language (e.g., what is being talked about). Second, 
affordances, or the ways in which one interacts with their environment, are derived from the 
objects (Gibson, 1979). Third, affordances are meshed to produce a coherent simulation. The 
syntax of a sentence provides instructions on how to mesh affordances by providing cues as to the 
general scene of the events being described into what amounts to a mental simulation (Kaschak & 
Glenberg, 2000).  
Zwaan‟s (2004) Immersed Experiencer Framework (IEF) also highlights the role that 
simulation plays in comprehension. The IEF couples the idea that readers track multiple aspects of 
a narrative with the Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory (Barsalou, 1999). The main premise of 
IEF is that the comprehender is an immersed experiencer of the described situation and language is 





of the described situation” and comprehension is “the vicarious experience of the described 
situation” (Zwaan, 2004, p.36).  To further illustrate what is meant by “immersed experiencer”, 
consider the following sentences (Zwaan, 2004, p. 36): 
(1a) The ranger saw the eagle in the sky. 
(1b) The ranger saw the eagle in the nest. 
Although similar, the sentences convey very different images of an eagle. In sentence (1a) the 
eagle‟s wings are outstretched as it flies through the sky. In sentence (1b) the eagle‟s wings might 
be folded as it sits in its nest. In an amodal propositional representation (e.g., Kintsch & van Dijk, 
1978) these sentences would appear as follows. 
(2a) [[SAW[RANGER, EAGLE]], [IN[EAGLE, SKY]]] 
(2b) [[SAW[RANGER, EAGLE]], [IN[EAGLE, NEST]]] 
An amodal propositional approach does not account for the shape of the eagle, while the Immersed 
Experiencer Framework (IEF) proposes that words activate experiences with their referents. 
According to the IEF, sentence 1a should activate visual experiences of an eagle with outstretched 
wings in the sky. Zwaan et al. (2002) found that this was indeed the case. Readers were faster to 
identify a picture of an object as being mentioned in a sentence if the shape of the object matched 
the shape implied in the sentences. By highlighting the modal nature of situation model, embodied 
theories of language comprehension have had a profound impact on the study of narrative 
comprehension and have begun to offer a compelling account of how it is that readers share the 





Simulation of Motion: Combining the Notion of Space, Time, and Embodied Language 
Comprehension 
As already mentioned, research indicates that readers simulate the perceptual and motor 
information described in text (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Brunyé et al., 2009; Fincher-Kiefer, 2001; 
Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Lozano, Hard, & Tversky, 2008; Matlock, 
2004; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Speer et al., 2009; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan 
& Madden, 2005; Zwaan, et al., 2002).  Recently, Zwaan and Madden (2005) have argued that 
simulations that occur during language comprehension necessarily include a spatio-temporal 
perspective of the described situation.  As mentioned earlier, findings suggest that, while reading, 
readers focus their attention on characters' movements and that their situation models include 
spatial and temporal aspects of a narrative (e.g., Bower & Morrow, 1990; Morrow et al., 1989; 
Zwaan, 1999b). Recent findings also suggest that during comprehension readers are able to 
imagine scenes and simulate the motion described in a narrative (e.g., Matlock, 2004; Speer et al., 
2009).  For example, in one study, Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, and Aveyard (2004) asked 
participants to listen to sentences describing the motion of an object (e.g., softball) and then judged 
whether two sequentially visually presented objects were the same (e.g., 2 pictures of softballs). 
On critical trials, subjects heard a sentence describing the ball as moving toward or away from the 
observer (e.g., “The pitcher hurled the softball to you”). Critically, the first picture of the ball was 
either slightly larger or smaller than the first picture, thus suggesting movement of the ball toward 
or away from the observer. Subjects were found to respond more quickly when the implied 
movement of the ball matched the movement described in the sentence. The results of other studies 





& Radvansky, 1998), as well as object size and rate of travel (Morrow & Clark, 1988). These types 
of findings further demonstrate that language comprehension involves a dynamic and perceptual 
simulation of motion. 
Additional evidence for a linguistically driven simulation of motion has also been observed in 
studies exploring an interesting type of implicit motion. Fictive motion is a type of figurative 
language that is pervasive across languages, and is typically used to describe physical space 
(Matlock, 2004). 
 (1a) The road runs along the coast.  
(1b) The trail goes from El Portal to Yosemite. 
Although both of these fictive motions sentences feature a motion verb (e.g., run, go), both sentences 
describe a stationary situation. Unlike the literal uses of motion verbs in sentences such as, “John walks 
along the coast” or the metaphorical, “The meeting runs past midnight”, fictive motion sentences 
communicate no change of state (Matlock, 2004). Many linguistic observations lend support to the idea 
that fictive motion involves simulation of motion or visual scanning. For example, in one study, 
readers took longer to read the sentence “Road 49 crosses the desert” when they were told earlier 
that the desert was 400 miles in diameter than when they were told the desert was only 30 miles in 
diameter (Matlock, 2004).  
 
Overall Summary 
Research suggests that adults and even children as young as 3 and 4 years of age build rich 
detailed mental representations of a narrative and that in doing so vicariously experience that 
which they read.  These findings provide support for the notion that readers and listeners “leap into 





chair you stroll through imagined landscapes as if they were real, and your thoughts interweave 
with the story…” (Flaubert, 1857). 
 
Present Investigation 
The aim of the present investigation is to determine whether young children, like adults, also 
simulate narrative events and specifically whether children simulate the speed of a narrative 
character’s movements during story comprehension? The studies in the present investigation are 
the first to directly explore this fascinating aspect of narrative cognition and mental simulation.  
Important questions about the developmental aspects of the ability to simulate narrative events 
have yet to be explored. For example, it is not yet clear whether the ability to simulate narrative 
events is an early emerging ability, potentially evident in children before they learn to read. In this 
case, might this ability be evident as children listen to oral stories? Indeed, little is known about the 
narrative precursors of reading comprehension, and particularly children‟s comprehension of oral 
stories. It has been argued that studies of the antecedents of reading comprehension are very much 
needed if we are to gain a fuller understanding of how literacy and narrative comprehension skills 
develop (Lynch et al., 2008). More specifically, Skarakis-Doyle and Dempsey (2008) have argued 
that an exploration of preschool-aged children‟s mental representations of stories is merited, given 
that, “many of the foundational abilities that contribute to children‟s comprehension of stories 
emerge in their oral language comprehension in advance of their learning to read” (p. 131). Thus, 
while an investigation of young children‟s ability to simulate narrative events is warranted in its 
own right, exploring this particular aspect of young children‟s narrative comprehension will 
address a hitherto relatively unexplored aspect of narrative competence of potential importance to 





A comprehensive model of narrative comprehension in children does not yet exist, but several 
aspects of young children‟s narrative comprehension have been quite extensively explored, 
including story structure understanding, inference making and comprehension monitoring (for 
reviews see Perfetti et al., 2005; Lynch et al., 2008). The study of young children‟s situation 
models is a more recent area of study, with only three studies to date exploring this aspect of 
children‟s narrative comprehension (O‟Neill & Shultis, 2007; Rall & Harris, 2000; Ziegler et al., 
2005). Some evidence from studies conducted with school-aged children who are poor readers has 
led to the suggestion that their comprehension difficulties may stem from problems building 
adequate situation models (Glenberg et al., 2004; Nation, 2007). Children‟s comprehension ability 
has also been studied from the vantage point of literacy development, with many studies 
concentrating on identifying critical components of reading ability and their developmental 
emergence (e.g., decoding, phonological processing, inference making). The ability to simulate 
narrative events has not been a focus of such studies.  
The three studies to date exploring young children‟s situation models (O‟Neill & Shultis, 
2007; Rall & Harris, 2000; Ziegler et al., 2005) have demonstrated that preschoolers‟ situation 
models of stories contain information about a character‟s location and mental goals and that 
preschoolers adopt the spatial (Rall & Harris, 2000; Ziegler et al., 2005) and mental perspective of 
the main character (O‟Neill & Shultis, 2007) by about 4 years of age. Although the work of Rall 
and Harris‟ (2000), Ziegler et al. (2005), and to some extent O‟Neill and Shultis (2007), has 
demonstrated that preschoolers do indeed track a character‟s spatial perspective, none of these 
studies explored the more dynamic temporal component of a character‟s movements. Indeed, as 





and considering that it has been argued with respect to linguistic input that, “…a simulation should 
share certain „physical‟ characteristics with its real world counterpart” (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001, 
p. 153; Barsalou, 1999), it is important to consider whether children track and simulate the spatial-
temporal aspects of narratives – for example, the duration of actions performed by a character.  
Three new studies were designed to explore the spatial-temporal aspects of young children‟s 
situation models of narratives by investigating whether and how children‟s expectations about the 
duration of certain activities (e.g., walking vs. driving) influences their simulation of narrative 
action. Research suggests that adult readers‟ expectations exert influence over a variety of 
narrative comprehension processes including simulations (e.g., Anderson et al., 1983; Rapp, Klug, 
& Taylor, 2006; Rapp & Taylor, 2004; Zwaan, 1994). For example, Rapp et al. (2006) explored 
the influence of readers‟ expectations on the well established finding that readers track a 
character‟s movements and take longer to identify objects that are located further from a 
character‟s current location than objects that are located near the character (Morrow et al., 1987; 
Morrow et al., 1989;). Rapp et al. (2006) found that when the events of a story did not clearly 
specify how a character moved from one location to another, and several alternative paths were 
available, readers no longer appeared to process text in a manner consistent with this spatial 
distance effect. The authors argue that expectations, which are often based on personal 
experiences, enable readers to anticipate how a narrative will unfold. And, in this case, the 
alternative paths made prediction of a character‟s path impossible, thus leading to the elimination 
of the spatial distance effect. Such findings highlight the importance of taking into consideration 






Because previous studies suggest that the ability to create detailed mental representations 
of narratives begins to emerge in preschoolers (O‟Neill & Shultis, 2007; Rall & Harris, 2000; 
Ziegler et al., 2005), the following three studies of children‟s ability to simulate a character‟s 
movement focused on 3- to 5-year-olds. Study 1 explored whether young children‟s expectations 
about the duration of particular physical activities (i.e., walking vs. driving) would influence their 
simulations of the speed of a character‟s movements. Study 2 explored whether children‟s 
expectations about the influence of certain motivating psychological factors (i.e., eagerness to get 
to a particular location) might also influence children‟s simulations of the speed of a character‟s 
actions. Study 3 explored the combined effect of children‟s expectations about the duration of 
particular physical activities, specifically walking and driving, with the motivating effect of 





Chapter 2: Study 1 
Introduction 
Study 1 explored whether young children‟s expectations about the duration of particular 
physical activities (i.e., walking vs. driving) would influence their simulations of the speed of a 
character‟s movements. To answer this question, the speed of a character‟s movement from one 
location to another was manipulated in a story describing a character engaging in two ordinary 
motor activities familiar to young children: namely, walking and driving. It was reasoned that if 
children‟s simulations of a character‟s movements are constrained by their expectations and 
personal experiences of the duration of these two activities, then a character that is walking should 
have more time to view scenes along the way than a character that is driving. And, in keeping with 
previously observed reading-time methodologies used to study narrative comprehension in adults 
(Matlock, 2004), a corresponding prediction would be that readers (or listeners) would demonstrate 
longer reading times (or processing times) to process the events observed by a character described 
as walking as opposed to driving.  
To test this prediction in young children, a self-paced reading task typically used to 
investigate narrative comprehension processes in adults was modified for use with preliterate 
children (e.g., Zwaan & Singer, 2003). In the adult version of the task, readers read a sentence 
displayed on a computer screen and press a computer key to be presented with the next sentence in 
the text, thus providing researchers with an estimate of the amount of time readers take to process 
each sentence. Because most 3- and 4-year-olds cannot read, the children in the present study 





sentence at a time and the children pressed a computer mouse button to hear each new sentence of 
the story, yielding a measure the amount of time each child took to listen to each sentence of the 
story (processing time or PT). No other study has utilized this type of methodology to investigate 
young children‟s story comprehension processes.  
The story described a small child, Jamie, visiting an elderly relative, aunt Alice (see 
Appendix A). In one part of the story, Jamie was described as walking to aunt Alice‟s house, and in 
another part of the story as being driven to aunt Alice‟s house (i.e., Jamie‟s mother said, “You 
know what Jamie? This time, let‟s walk/drive to aunt Alice‟s.”). Along the way to aunt Alice‟s 
house, Jamie was described as viewing a series of four different events (e.g., dogs in a park, some 
children playing baseball). Children heard a different, but similar, set of four events for each of the 
two manipulations of the character‟s movement (drive/walk). It was predicted that, if preschoolers 
simulate a character‟s movement while listening to a story, then they should proceed through the 
description of the four events Jamie sees along the way to aunt Alice‟s house more quickly (i.e., 
faster PT) when Jamie is being driven past them as opposed to walking past them. That is, it was 
reasoned that if children‟s simulations of a character‟s movements and experiences are influenced 
by their expectations of the duration of these movements - for example, it takes less time to reach a 
particular location when one is riding in a car as opposed to walking – then these expectations 








The participants were 48 native speakers of English with no reported history of speech or 
hearing difficulties: 24 younger preschoolers (12 boys and 12 girls, mean age = 47 months, range 
= 40 to 53), 24 older preschoolers (12 boys and 12 girls, mean age = 59 months, range = 55 to 65) 
drawn from a university child laboratory database. An additional 7 children were tested but 
excluded from the dataset because of fussiness (n =3) or unwillingness to listen to the story (n = 4).  
Procedure and Materials 
Children were seated at a small table beside an experimenter. Two different tasks were 
administered to each child. Each child first received the story listening task, followed by four 
subtests of a standardized measure of language development (Clinical Evaluation of Language 
Fundamentals – Preschool, Second Edition (CELF-P2); Wiig, Secord, & Semel, 2004).  
Story listening task 
The main focus of the study was children‟s performance on the story listening task. Each child 
listened to 2 pre-recorded stories (1 practice and 1 experimental story) presented via computer 
speakers. The stories were recorded one sentence at a time using Audacity recording software 
(2007) by an adult female research assistant not otherwise affiliated with the study. Children heard 
one sentence of the story at a time and pressed a mouse button to hear the next sentence of the 
story. The time from the end of each sentence to the child‟s next button press (i.e., processing time 
or PTs) was measured and logged by a Vault PC Series computer. Both story presentation and 





At the start of each session, a drawing depicting Jamie, a friendly looking preschool child (a 
boy for male participants and a girl for female participants), was placed in front of the children. 
Children were introduced to the story listening procedure by listening to a 15-sentence practice 
story. Children were encouraged to listen carefully to the story by being told that they would later 
be asked four questions about the story and would receive a sticker for every correct answer.  
The experimental story described Jamie visiting aunt Alice‟s house and contained two 
manipulations of the character‟s movement. The story consisted of seven components (Appendix 
A). Component 1 introduced the setting of the story. The first manipulation of the character‟s 
movement occurred in Component 2. Children heard Jamie‟s mom say “You know what Jamie? 
This time, let‟s walk/drive to aunt Alice‟s”. In Component 3, immediately following this 
movement manipulation, children heard a 4-sentence long description of the scenery Jamie saw 
along the way to the aunt‟s house (e.g., kids playing baseball, birds flying around someone‟s yard). 
Component 4 described Jamie‟s adventures at aunt Alice‟s house, return home, as well as the 
reason for returning to aunt Alice‟s house (i.e., forgotten cell phone). Component 5 contained a 
reverse manipulation of the character‟s movement to aunt Alice‟s house. In Component 6, children 
heard a 4-sentence long description of the scenery Jamie saw along the way back to aunt Alice‟s 
house similar to that of Component 3. Component 7 concluded the story. To assess children‟s 
ability to simulate a character‟s movements, children‟s PTs , collected during the descriptions of 
the scenery Jamie saw along the way to aunt Alice‟s house (i.e., Component 3 and 6), in the walk 
condition were compared to the corresponding set of PTs in the drive condition. Each child heard 
the story once. The presentation order of components 2 and 5 (movement manipulation) and 3 and 





children were asked four story comprehension questions: Who did Jamie visit?/What did Jamie do 
at aunt Alice‟s?/How did Jamie get there the first/second time? Children received one point for 
every correct answer.  
Language measures 
Because children‟s linguistic abilities have been linked to story comprehension in young 
children (e.g., Cain, Oakhill, & Bryant, 2004; Cain & Oakhill, 2007), a standardized measure of 
language development was administered: CELF-P2 (Wiig et al., 2004). Children were 
administered the three core language subtests (Sentence Structure, Word Structure, and Expressive 
Vocabulary) of the CELF-P2 as well as the Recalling Sentences in Context (RSC) supplementary 
subtest which evaluates a child‟s ability to repeat sentences presented in the context of a story 
without changing the wording of the sentence. The CELF-P2 was selected because it can be 
administered fairly quickly to young children and is commonly used to provide a broad overview 
of children‟s general language ability. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Thirty-six out of 46 children
1
 answered at least three of the four story comprehension questions 
correctly, suggesting that overall the children had complied with instructions and listened carefully 
to the story2. The data analysis focused on a comparison of the mean of the four PTs collected, for 
each child, during the 4-sentence description of the scenery Jamie saw along the way to aunt 
Alice‟s house in the walk portion of the story with the mean of the four PTs collected during the 4-
sentence description of scenery in the drive portion of the story (i.e., Story components 3 and 6; 8 





analysis was performed on children‟s processing times. A conservative approach was adopted and 
any PTs that were four standard deviations from each participant‟s condition mean were removed, 
resulting in the exclusion of 2.2% of the total data. Participants‟ mean PTs were then submitted to 
a Speed of Movement (walk vs. drive) x Age (younger vs. older preschoolers) x Sex (girl vs. boy) 
x Story Order (walk /drive vs. drive/walk) repeated measures mixed model ANOVA with age, sex, 
and story order as the between-subjects variables and Speed of Movement as the within-subjects 
factor.  The analysis revealed no significant main effects of age, F(1, 40) = 2.3, MSE = 606454,     
p = .14, η2= .06, sex, F(1, 40) = .43, MSE = 606454, p = .52, η2= .01, or story order, F(1, 40) = .48, 
MSE = 606454, p = .5, η2= .01; and none of these variables interacted with Speed of Movement, all 
ps > .1.  
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Speed of Movement condition, F(1, 40) = 9.7, MSE = 
173075, p = .003, η2= .2. As predicted, children‟s mean PTs were significantly faster when Jamie 
was driven (M = 796 ms, SE= 61 ms) versus when Jamie walked to aunt Alice‟s house (M = 1064 
ms, SE = 111 ms), resulting in a mean difference of 268 ms between conditions. Children‟s mean 
PTs were faster on all 4 scenery sentences (i.e., Story Components 3 and 6) in the drive condition 
than in the walk condition. Table 2, on page 47, provides the results of more detailed sentence by 
sentence paired-samples t-test analyses of the speed of movement effect.   
Moreover, this speed of movement effect was highly specific and confined only to the 
sentences in Components 3 and 6 pertaining to the description of the scenery the character Jamie 
observed along the way to aunt Alice‟s house. That is, it was not observed for the movement 
manipulation sentence that immediately preceded the scenery description, even though the movement 
word „walk‟ or „drive‟ was explicitly stated (i.e., “You know what Jamie? This time, let‟s walk/drive to 





also not observed for each of the two sentences immediately following each of the two key scenery 
description components (i.e., Sentence 11 or 30, t(47) = .88, p = .39, M Walk (i.e., following walk 
condition scenery sentences) = 1070 ms, M Drive (i.e., following drive condition scenery sentences) = 
1209 ms; or Sentence 12 or 31, t(47) = .58, p = .56, M Walk Condition = 1292 ms, M Drive = 1144 ms. In 
addition, no significant effect of speed of movement was found for the full remaining portions of the 
story (i.e., Components 4 and 7), t(47) = 1.4, p = .18, M Walk = 1265 ms, M Drive = 1380 ms. That is the 
speed of movement effect was confined only to the focal Components 3 and 6. 
 
Table 2                                                                                                                                                       
Children‟s PTs in Study 1, collected during the four scenery sentences 
a
 presented to children in the 
Walk and Drive conditions (N= 48). 
 
a.  
See Appendix A, Example of Study 1 Story, Components 3 & 6 (Sentences 7-10 and 26-29).  
 
 
  Processing Times (ms)   
   
Condition 
  











2  1274 1001 273 (124) .03 
3  975 543 432 (170) .01 





With respect to the children‟s CELF-P2 scores, correlation analyses did not reveal a 
significant relation between children‟s performance on the story listening task (as assessed by 
processing time difference scores between the walk and drive condition) and children‟s 
performance on any of the CELF-P2 subtests (all ps > .1).  
In interpreting the results of this study, the reader is reminded that the scenery description 
sentences were counterbalanced across the walk/drive condition and across participants, thus any 
differences with regard to the content of the scenery descriptions or presentation order cannot 
account for the results. Overall, these findings support the hypothesis that children simulate a 
character‟s movement during story comprehension and that these simulations are influenced by 






Chapter 3: Study 2                                                                                            
Study 2 was designed to further explore the manner in which children‟s expectations and 
general world knowledge influence their simulations of the duration of a character‟s movements. 
Older preschoolers‟ sophisticated understanding of other people‟s mental states is well documented 
(e.g., Perner, 1991; Wellman, 2002) and previous studies have revealed that 4-year-olds track and 
adopt a character‟s mental goal perspective (O‟Neill & Shultis, 2007). Study 2 explored the impact 
of a far more sophisticated type of expectation on children‟s simulations of the speed of a 
character‟s movements, namely, the motivating influence of certain psychological states such as 
eagerness was explored.  
To illustrate what is meant by eagerness, consider the following passage from The Secret 
Garden (Hodgson Burnett, 1909/1993). The main character, Mary, has just introduced Dickon to 
the secret garden and Dickon has discovered that, despite appearances, some of the plants in the 
garden may still be alive: 
“…this here‟s a new bit”, and he touched a shoot that looked 
greenish-brown instead of hard, dry grey. Mary touched it herself in 
an eager, reverent way. “That one?” she said “is that one quite alive 
– quite?” Dickon curved his wide smiling mouth. “It‟s as wick as 
you or me,” he said; and Mary remembered that Martha had told 
her that “wick” meant “alive” or “lively.” “I‟m glad it‟s wick!” she 
cried out in her whisper. “I want them all to be wick. Let us go 
around the garden and count how many wick ones there are.” She 
quite panted with eagerness, and Dickon was as eager as she was. 
They went from tree to tree and from bush to bush. Dickon carried 







The above passage does not explicitly state how quickly Mary and Dickon moved about the 
garden, however, the use of the words “eager” and “eagerness” may easily lead an experienced 
reader to imagine Mary and Dickon moving fairly quickly from plant to plant inspecting each for 
signs of life. But how would a more inexperienced story listener, such as preschooler, comprehend 
a similar passage? Would young children‟s simulations of the character‟s movements reflect a 
character‟s eagerness?  
To answer these questions, two new stories describing Jamie getting ready for an activity (e.g., 
going to the dentist or the ice cream store) were created. Jamie‟s eagerness was manipulated by 
including a sentence in each story describing Jamie as thinking that an activity she was getting 
ready for was either “really great” (i.e., eager condition) or “really horrible” (i.e., not eager 
condition). Just as in the excerpt presented above, it was hypothesized that a state of eagerness 
should result in a character moving more quickly (e.g., getting ready faster) than a state of non-
eagerness, resulting in a character moving more slowly. Thus, the prediction with regard to 
processing times was that children‟s PTs should be faster when the character is progressing 
through the “getting ready” actions while thinking the activity he/she is getting ready for is “really 




The participants were 48 native speakers of English with no reported history of speech or 
hearing difficulties: 24 4-year-olds (12 boys and 12 girls, mean age = 52 months, range = 47 to 





university child laboratory database. An additional 7 children were tested but excluded from the 
dataset because of fussiness or unwillingness to listen to both of the stories.  
 
Procedure and Materials 
Children were seated at a small table beside the experimenter. All children were administered 
the story listening task, followed by the CELF-P2‟s (Wiig et al., 2004) three core language subtests 
(Sentence Structure, Word Structure, and Expressive Vocabulary) as well as the Recalling 
Sentences in Context (RSC) supplementary subtest.  In addition, parents were asked to describe 
and rate their child‟s feelings about going to the ice cream store/dentist using a 5-point scale (i.e., 1 
= child REALLY does not like going and 5 = child REALLY likes going to ice cream 
store/dentist).  Children were asked to simply indicate, by replying yes or no, whether they liked 
going to either location. This information was important in demonstrating that, even if the child‟s 
perspective differed from the character‟s perspective, children‟s simulation would reflect the 
character‟s perspective rather than their own.  
 
Story-listening task 
 The story-listening task used in this study was essentially the same as the one used in Study 1. 
However, unlike Study 1, children in Study 2 listened to two different stories. Each story described 
the activities of a young child, Jamie, as she/he got ready to, and eventually engaged in, an activity 
(i.e., going to the ice cream store/dentist).  Just as in Study 1, prior to the presentation of the 
stories, children were shown a laminated 11 x 8 inch drawing depicting Jamie, a friendly looking 
preschool boy for the boys and girl for the girls. The picture remained on the desk throughout the 





Each story consisted of four components (see Appendix B for an example story). Following 
the story introduction (Component 1), the character‟s eagerness was manipulated (Component 2). 
In the eager condition, children heard that “Jamie thought that going to the ice cream store/dentist 
was really great”.  In the not eager condition, children heard that “Jamie thought that going to the 
ice cream store/dentist was really horrible.”  Immediately following the eagerness manipulation, 
children heard a 6-sentence long description of Jamie‟s preparatory activities (i.e., changing 
clothes or cleaning up; Component 3).  After the preparatory activities, children heard about 
Jamie‟s adventures at the ice cream store/dentist (Component 4). To assess children‟s ability to 
simulate the duration of a character‟s movement, children‟s PTs collected during Jamie‟s 
preparatory activities (i.e., Component 3) in the eager condition were compared to the 
corresponding set of PTs from the not eager condition. 
The activity (i.e., going to the ice cream store/dentist), the character‟s eagerness (i.e. eager/not 
eager), the two preparatory activities (i.e., changing clothes/cleaning up), and the presentation 
order of the stories (i.e., dentist story first/dentist second) were counterbalanced across children.  
Each child listened to one story about Jamie going to the ice cream store and one story about Jamie 
going to the dentist, each with a different eagerness manipulation and set of preparatory activities.  
As in Study 1, to ensure that children were actively listening to the stories, the experimenter 
told the children that at the end of each story they would be asked some questions about the story 
and would receive a sticker for every correct answer. In an effort not to draw children‟s attention to 
the character‟s eagerness, children were not questioned about the character‟s thoughts about each 
activity. The three questions asked at the end of the ice cream story included: Where did Jamie go 





his/her ice cream? The three question asked at the end of the dentist story included: Where did 
Jamie go in that story?; Why did Jamie go to the dentist?;  What happened to Jamie‟s tooth? 
Children scored one point for every correct answer.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Forty-four of 46 children answered at least five of the six questions correctly, suggesting that 
overall the children had complied with instructions and listened carefully to the story. The data 
analysis focused on a comparison of the six PTs for each child during each of the character‟s 
preparatory activity sentences (Story Component 3) in both the eager condition and the not eager 
condition. Processing times that were four standard deviations from each participant‟s condition 
mean were considered outliers and eliminated from further analyses, resulting in the exclusion of 
4% of the total data.  
Participants‟ mean PTs were then submitted to a Eagerness (eager vs. not eager) x Age (4- vs. 
5-year olds) x Sex (male vs. female) x Story Order (eager/not eager vs. not eager/eager) x Story 
Version (eager to go to dentist/not eager to go to ice cream store vs. eager to go to ice cream 
store/not eager to go to dentist) repeated measures mixed model ANOVA with age, sex, story 
order, and story version as the between-subjects variables and Eagerness as the within-subjects 
variable.  The ANOVA did not reveal a main effect of age, F(1, 32) = .7, MSE = 234363, p = .41, 
η2= .02, sex, F(1, 32) = .001, MSE = 234363, p = .98, η2= .00, story order, F(1, 32) = 2.1, MSE = 
234363, p = .16, η2= .06, or story version, F(1, 32) = 1, MSE = 234363, p = .32, η2= .03; and none 





The ANOVA revealed a main effect of eagerness, F(1, 32) = 23.4, MSE = 69318, p < .001, 
η2= .42. Children‟s PTs were significantly faster when the character was described as thinking that 
the activity was “really great” (i.e., eager condition; M = 676 ms, SE= 49 ms), than when the 
character was described as thinking that the activity was “really horrible” (i.e., not eager condition; 
M = 941 ms, SE = 58 ms), resulting in a mean difference of 265 ms between conditions.  
Children‟s mean PTs were faster on all six sentences of Component 3 in the eager condition than in 
the not eager condition. Table 3 provides the results of more detailed sentence by sentence paired-
samples t-test analyses of the eagerness effect. 
 
Table 3                                                                                                                                                        
Children‟s PTs in Study 2, collected during the six preparatory sentences 
a.
 presented to children in the 














a. See Appendix B, Example of Study 2 Story, Components 3 (Sentences 6-11).  
 














p < .001 
2 832 557 275 (83) p = .002 
3 678 530 148 (76) p = .06 
4 852 640 212 (115) p = .07 
5 850 678 172 (86) p = .05 





Moreover, the main effect of eagerness was highly specific and confined only to the sentences 
pertaining to the character‟s preparatory activities (Component 3). That is, it was not observed for the 
eagerness manipulation sentence that immediately preceded the preparatory activities, even though the 
word „horrible‟ or „great‟ was explicitly stated (i.e., “Jamie thought that going to the ice cream store 
was really great/horrible”), t(47) = 1.6, p = .15, M Eager = 897 ms, M Not Eager = 1030 ms. It was also not 
observed for each of the two sentences immediately following the preparatory activity sentences 
(Sentence 12: t(47) = 1.1, p = .27 (M Eager = 758 ms, M Not Eager = 889 ms); Sentence 13, t(47) = .05, p = 
.96 (M Eager = 872 ms, M Not Eager = 866 ms). Nor was it observed for Component 1, t(47) = .56, p = .58 
(M Eager Condition = 1132 ms, M Not Eager = 1190 ms) or Component 4, t(47) = .18, p = .86 (M Eager = 1055 
ms, M Not Eager = 1067 ms). 
With respect to the children‟s CELF-P2 scores, correlation analyses revealed a significant 
relation between children‟s performance on the story listening task (as assessed by processing time 
difference scores between the eager and not eager condition) and children‟s performance on the 
CELF-P2 Recalling Sentences in Context (RSC) supplementary subtest, r(47) = .37, p < .015. 
None of the other CELF‟s language subtest scores (sentence structure, word structure, and 
expressive vocabulary subtest scores) correlated significantly with children‟s performance on the 
story listening task (all ps > .25). The nature of the relation between children‟s RSC scores and 
their performance on the story listening task is not yet clear and warrants further study.   
The results of the parent and child questionnaire do not suggest children‟s own feelings about 
the two activities (i.e., going to ice cream store/dentist) influenced their ability to simulate the 
character‟s actions. Overall, parents rated their children‟s feelings about the dentist as positive 
(mean = 3.8 out of 5), and their feelings about the ice cream stores as significantly more positive 





cream store. All but nine of the 48 children also said that they liked going to the dentist. Thus, in 
almost all cases when the character was described as thinking the activity was “really horrible,” the 
character‟s perspective differed from that of the child participant‟s perspective. Nevertheless, a 
significant effect of eagerness in the hypothesized direction was observed. Additionally, 
correlation analyses did not reveal a significant relation between children‟s performance on the 
story listening task (as assessed by processing time difference scores between the eager and not 
eager condition) and parent ratings‟ of their child‟s feelings about going to the dentist, r(47) = .17, 
p = .27, and going to an ice cream store, r(47) = .16, p = .28.  
Overall, the results of this study suggest that children‟s expectations about the influence of 
certain motivating psychological factors (i.e., eagerness to get to a particular location) might also 
influence children‟s simulations of the speed of a character‟s actions. Children‟s processing times 
were faster for sentences describing a child character “getting ready” (e.g., getting dressed) for an 
activity that he/she thinks is “really great” as opposed to “really horrible.” Furthermore, children‟s 
own feelings about the activities the character was getting ready for did not seem to influence 
children‟s processing times. That is children‟s processing time were consistent with the character‟s 
perspective, even when their own perspective toward each activity differed from that of the 
character (e.g., child listener liked going to the ice cream store but story character thinks that going 





Chapter 4: Study 3 
The results of Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that preliterate children construct rich mental 
representations of the events described in a narrative. Specifically, the results of these two studies 
demonstrate that children simulate the speed of a character‟s movements and actions during story 
comprehension and that these simulations are constrained by certain physical and psychological 
factors that can influence the duration of these movements and actions.  In Study 1, children‟s PTs 
were slower for scenery descriptions of what a character saw along the way to a relative‟s house 
when the character was described as walking as opposed to driving. These results suggest that 
children simulate a character‟s movements during story comprehension and that these simulations 
share certain „physical‟ characteristics of these real-world movements (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001, 
p. 153; see Barsalou, 1999). Using an entirely new set of stories, the results of Study 2 
demonstrated that children‟s simulations of the speed of a character‟s movements are also 
constrained by the impact of a psychological factor, such as a character‟s eagerness to engage in an 
activity. Children progressed faster through a set of sentences describing the character‟s 
subsequent preparatory activities when the character was described as thinking the activity he/she 
was preparing for was “really great” as opposed to “really horrible”.  The results of Study 2 
indicate that by 4 years of age children monitor the motivating influence of certain psychological 
states such as eagerness on a character‟s subsequent actions.   
Study 3 was designed to further explore children‟s situation models by focusing on the 
manner in which children‟s expectations and spatial-temporal and psychological knowledge might 
combine to influence their simulations of a character‟s movements. That is, to put the predictions 





spatial-temporal movement variables (i.e., walking and driving) observed in Study 1 might be 
moderated by the psychological variable of eagerness investigated in Study 2. More specifically, 
among children in the Walk Condition (N = 16), the prediction was that a character‟s described 
state of eagerness (eager, not eager) would exert an influence on children‟s PTs, given that the 
speed of walking is under a person‟s control.  Among children assigned to the Drive Condition (N 
= 16), however, the prediction was the opposite: namely, that a character‟s described state of 
eagerness (eager, not eager) would not exert an influence on children‟s PTs, given that the speed of 
being driven is not under a passenger‟s control.  That is, it was reasoned that when a character does 
control the speed of his/her movement, then the character‟s eagerness should influence children‟s 
PTs but when the speed of movement is not under a character‟s control, then the character‟s 
eagerness should not influence children‟s PTs. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 32 4-year-old native speakers of English with no reported history of 
speech or hearing difficulties, drawn from a university child laboratory database: 16 boys and 16 
girls, (mean age = 55 months, range 48 to 61 months). Sixteen were randomly assigned to the 
Walk condition (mean age = 55 months, range 48 to 61 months). Sixteen others were randomly 
assigned to the Drive condition (mean age = 55 months, range 48 to 61 months). An additional 4 





Procedure and Materials 
The Walk condition explored the influence of the character‟s eagerness when the character 
walked to his/her aunt‟s house, while the Drive condition explored the influence of eagerness when 
the character was driven to his/her aunt‟s house. The story listening task used in this study was 
identical to that of Study 1, with the exception of the inclusion of two sentences used in Study 2 to 
describe the character‟s eagerness (i.e., “Jamie thought that going to aunt Alice‟s was really 
great/horrible.”). This sentence was presented right after the movement manipulation sentence 
(“You know what Jamie? This time, let‟s walk/drive to aunt Alice‟s”). All other components of the 
story and procedure remained the same (Appendix C).  
Each child heard the story once. As in Study 1, the presentation order of Story Components 
3 and 7 (eagerness manipulation) and 4 and 8 (descriptions of scenery) were fully counterbalanced 
across children. As in Study 1, following the story, children were asked several story 
comprehension questions: two questions from Study 1 (Who did Jamie visit; What did Jamie do at 
aunt Alice‟s?) and two additional questions, (Did Jamie want to go his/her aunt‟s house the 
first/second time?). Children received one point for every correct answer. Following the story 
listening task, children were administered the CELF-P2‟s (Wiig et al., 2004) core language 
subtests (Sentence Structure, Word Structure, and Expressive Vocabulary) as well as the Recalling 
Sentences in Context (RSC) supplementary subtest. 
 
Results 
Twenty-three of 30 children answered at least three of the four story questions correctly, 





data analysis focused on a comparison of the four PTs collected, for each child, during the 4-sentence 
description of scenery Jamie saw along the way to aunt Alice‟s house in the eager portion of the story 
with the four PTs collected for during the 4-sentence description of scenery in the not eager portion of 
the story (i.e., Story components 4 and 8; 8 PTs in total). Processing times that were four standard 
deviations from each participant‟s condition mean were considered outliers and eliminated from further 
analyses, resulting in the exclusion of 2.2% of the total data. 
Participants‟ mean PTs were then submitted to an Eagerness (eager vs. not eager) x Speed of 
Movement (walk vs. drive) x Story Order (eager/not eager vs. not eager/eager) x Sex (male vs. female) 
repeated measures mixed model ANOVA with speed of movement, story order, and sex as the 
between-subjects factors and eagerness as the within-subjects factor. The ANOVA did not reveal a 
main effect of story order, F(1, 24) = .4, MSE = 335269, p = .53, η
2
= .02; sex, F(1, 24) = 2.3, MSE = 
335269, p = .14, η
2
= .09; or speed of movement, F(1, 24) = .72, MSE = 335269, p = .4, η
2
= .03. The 
ANOVA did reveal a main effect of eagerness, F(1, 24) = 4.6, MSE = 156494, p = .042, η
2
= .15. 
Children‟s PT‟s were significantly faster in the eager condition (M = 838 ms, SE = 98 ms) than in the 
not eager condition (M = 1049 ms, SE = 76 ms). Critically, however, the analysis revealed a significant 
eagerness by speed of movement interaction, F(1, 24) = 5.5, MSE = 156494, p = .032, η
2
= .14. As 
predicted, the effect of eagerness was only observed in the walk condition and not in the drive 
condition. The details of this interaction are explored below for the walk and drive condition separately.  
As found in Study 1 and 2, correlation analyses did not reveal a significant relation between 
children‟s performance on the story listening task (as assessed by processing time difference scores 
between the not eager and eager condition) and children‟s performance on any of the language subtests 





language scores also did not differ significantly across the two speed of movement conditions, t(27) = 
1.4, p = .27.  
Walk Condition 
Twelve out of 15 children answered at least three of the four story comprehension questions 
correctly, suggesting that overall children had complied with instructions and listened carefully to the 
story. The ANOVA did not reveal a main effect of story order, F(1, 12) = 3.2, MSE = 198419, p = .10, 
η
2
= .2; or sex, F(1, 12) = .1, MSE = 198419, p = .75, η
2
= .009. None of these variables interacted with 
Eagerness, all ps > .1. Children‟s PT‟s were significantly faster in the eager condition (M = 663ms, SE 
= 57 ms) than in the not eager condition (M = 1102 ms, SE = 146 ms), resulting in a main effect of 
eagerness, F(1, 12) = 13.2, MSE = 112999, p = .003, η
2
= .52. Children‟s mean PTs were faster on all 4 
scenery sentences (i.e., Components 4 and 8) in the eager condition than in the not eager condition. 
Table 4 provides the results of more detailed sentence-by-sentence paired-samples t-test analyses of the 
effect of eagerness.  
Moreover, this effect of eagerness was highly specific and confined only to the sentences in 
Components 4 and 8 pertaining to the description of the scenery Jamie observed along the way to aunt 
Alice‟s house. That is, it was not observed for the eagerness manipulation sentence that immediately 
preceded the scenery description, even though the words „great‟ or „horrible‟ were explicitly stated (i.e., 
“Jamie thought that going to visit aunt Alice‟s was really great/horrible.”; Components 3 & 7), t(15) = 
.25, p = .8 (M Not Eager = 1221 ms, M Eager = 1326 ms). It was also not observed on either of the two 
sentences immediately following each of the two key scenery description components (i.e., Sentence 12 
or 32, t(15) = 1.1, p = .27, M Not Eager = 1550 ms, M Eager = 1021 ms; or Sentence 13 or 33, t(15) = .98, p 
= .34, M Not Eager = 1180 ms, M Eager = 937 ms. In addition, no significant eagerness effect was found for 





Table 4                                                                                                                                                       
Children‟s PTs in Study 3‟s Walk condition, collected during the four scenery sentences 
a.
 presented to 















Eleven of the 15 children answered at least three of the four story questions correctly, 
suggesting that overall children had complied with instructions and listened carefully to the story. As in 
the walk condition, the ANOVA did not reveal a main effect of story order, F(1, 12) = 3.7, MSE = 
472118, p = .08, η
2
= .24, or sex, F(1, 12) = 4.1, MSE = 472118, p = .07, η
2
= .26; and none of these 
variables interacted with Eagerness, all ps > .4.  
Unlike the results of the walk condition, children‟s PTs were not significantly faster in the 
eager condition (M = 1013 ms, SE = 195 ms) than in the not eager condition (M = 996 ms, SE = 142 




. Table 5 provides the results of more detailed 
sentence-by-sentence paired-samples t-test analyses of the eagerness effect. Children‟s mean PTs on 














p = .02 
2 1399 880 519 (270) p = .07 
3 875 484 390 (142) p = .02 






the 4 scenery sentences (i.e., Components 4 and 8) revealed no consistent pattern of being faster or 
slower.  
Table 5                                                                                                                                                    
Children‟s PTs in Study 3‟s Drive condition, collected during the four scenery sentences 
a.
 presented to 








a. See Appendix C, Example of Study 3 Story, Components 4 & 8 (Sentences 8-11 and 28-31).  
 
 
In addition, as in the previous studies, an effect of eagerness was not observed for the eagerness 
manipulation sentence that preceded the scenery description, t(15) = .44, p = .67 (M Not Eager = 1163 ms, 
M Eager = 1298 ms). It was also not observed on either of the two sentences immediately following each 
of the two key scenery description components (i.e., Sentence 12 or 32, t(15) = .17, p = .87, M Not Eager = 
1076 ms, M Eager = 1120 ms,; or Sentence 13 or 33, t(15) = 1.5, p = .15, M Not Eager = 850 ms, M Eager = 
1217 ms. In addition, no significant eagerness effect was found for the remaining Components 5 and 9, 
t(15) = .85, p = .41, M Not Eager = 1117 ms, M Eager = 1238 ms.  
 














p = .47 
2 1354 1347 -7 (215) p = .97 
3 915 884 31 (274) p = .91 







Overall the results of Study 3 suggest that children‟s simulations of character speed of 
movement are also constrained by the impact of a psychological factor, such as eagerness. 
Children PTs were faster when the character was described as eager, as opposed to not eager, to get 
to his/her aunt‟s house, but only when the speed of the character‟s movement was under his/her 
control; namely, when walking but not when being driven.  Furthermore, in interpreting the results 
of Study 3, the reader is reminded that the scenery descriptions were counterbalanced across 
children, thus any differences with regard to their content and presentation order cannot account 
for the results. Overall, these findings support the hypothesis that children simulate a character‟s 
movement during story comprehension and that these simulations are constrained by their 
knowledge and expectations of the motivating influence of certain psychological states, 







Chapter 5                                                                                                    
General Discussion, Implications, Caveats, and Future Directions  
General Discussion 
Children are exposed to a variety of narratives throughout childhood. As the following 
opening passage of Marcel Proust's essay On Reading (1905) so beautifully depicts, stories and 
books are an experience: 
There are perhaps no days of our childhood we lived so fully as 
those we believe we left without having lived them, those we spent 
with a favorite book. 
And indeed, research indicates that, in many ways, readers and listeners experience that which they 
read. Over thirty years of research exploring the mental processes involved in the comprehension 
of narratives, although mostly in adults, (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kintsch, 1998; Zwaan, 1999; 
Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Zwaan et al., 1995), has revealed that, during comprehension, readers 
and listeners construct detailed multidimensional representations of the situations and events 
described in a narrative. And a growing body of research investigating the dynamic and embodied 
nature of these mental representations has demonstrated that comprehension involves the mental 
simulation of the described events and actions (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Matlock, 2004). The present 
investigation joins a small set of recent studies exploring this fascinating aspect of children‟s 
narrative development. 
My studies have revealed that preliterate children‟s simulations of a character‟s movements 
are influenced by their expectations of the duration of the described activities and by their 





that while listening to a story, children simulate a character‟s movements and that these 
simulations are influenced by children‟s expectations about the duration of certain activities such 
as walking and driving. Children‟s processing times were slower for scenery descriptions of what 
the character saw along the way to a relative‟s house when the character was described as walking 
as opposed to driving. Study 2 demonstrated for the first time that preschoolers‟ simulations of 
character actions are constrained by the motivating influence of certain psychological states such 
as eagerness. When the character in the story was described as thinking an upcoming activity (e.g., 
going to ice cream store or dentist) was “really great,” children‟s processing times were faster for 
sentences describing the character getting ready for this activity than when the character was 
described as thinking the upcoming activity was “really horrible”.  Furthermore, the results of 
Study 2 indicate that preliterate children simulated a character‟s actions even when their own 
perspective toward each activity differed from the character‟s perspective (e.g., child listener liked 
going to the ice cream store but story character thinks that going to the ice cream store is “really 
horrible”). Finally, Study 3 extended the findings of Study 1 and 2 by demonstrating that children‟s 
simulations of a character‟s speed of movement are also influenced by the impact of a 
psychological factor - eagerness. Children progressed through a description of the scenery and 
events a narrative character observed along the way to his/her aunt‟s house faster when the 
character was described as eager, as opposed to not eager, to get there, but only when the speed of 







Although the results of the three studies presented here suggest that children simulate 
narrative events while listening to a story, the story listening task is not sufficiently sensitive to 
determine precisely what is happening during sentence processing. For instance, if children are 
listening to a sentence describing a character‟s movements (e.g., “On the way to aunt Alice‟s, they 
saw some dogs in a park”) and they simulate what the character sees along the way, it is unclear 
how exactly the simulation is “sped up” in the drive condition as opposed to the walk condition. 
Does „faster‟ in this case mean that they view the scene in less detail than children in the walk 
condition? Or might there exist individual differences the way in which children “view” the scene 
that the story listening task cannot pick up? A more visually based task might be better suited to 
teasing apart these alternatives and revealing a more detailed picture of what is happening during 
children‟s simulations of a character‟s movement. For example as implemented in adult research, 
children could be probed with different visual material to see which corresponds to their simulation 
(e.g., a blurrier picture of scene when moving quickly vs. slowly).  
It is also unclear what is happening moment-to-moment while children construct a situation 
model of Jamie‟s activities. For instance, how do space and time contribute to children‟s 
simulations of the character‟s movements? Do they contribute equally or, as suggested by Zwaan 
and Radvansky (1998), does temporal information, which in this case might entail children‟s 
expectations about the duration of certain activities, play a more robust role in the construction of a 
situation model? These questions stress the need for more studies exploring this fascinating aspect 





previous studies are in many ways only first steps in the study of children‟s simulations of a 
narrative character‟s experiences.  
Finally, it must also be noted that the issue of whether language comprehension, in general, is 
fundamentally embodied or symbolic is complicated and hundreds of years old. The studies 
comprising the present investigation were not designed to test between these two accounts of 
language comprehension, but rather to explore preliterate children‟s situation models within a 
narrative context and the role that simulations may play in children‟s comprehension of narratives. 
More specifically, they explored what kind of information may be represented in children‟s 
situation models (i.e., a character‟s spatio-temporal perspective). I believe the results of these 
studies lend themselves to a more embodied interpretation rather than a strictly traditional account 
of comprehension.  
Theoretical Implications 
The present investigation makes a number of novel theoretical contributions to the study of 
narrative comprehension and narrative development in young children with respect to narrative 
comprehension, simulation, and our understanding of the function of narratives. These 
contributions will be discussed in turn.  
Development of Narrative Comprehension 
The results of the present investigation extend the findings of previous studies of preliterate 
children‟s situation models and narrative comprehension in three main ways (O‟Neill & Shultis, 
2007; Rall & Harris, 2000; Ziegler et al., 2005). First, the present investigation is the first to 
explore the systematic capacity of preschool-aged children to track the spatial-temporal aspect of a 





the dynamic nature of children‟s narrative comprehension by exploring children‟s ability to 
simulate a character‟s perspective as it unfolds over time. Third, by examining the interplay 
between children‟s expectations of the influence of physical and psychological constraints on a 
character‟s movements, Studies 2 and 3 shed light on the impressive intricacies of children‟s 
simulations of narrative events. Indeed, the results of these studies speak to arguments that 
narrative comprehension is an intricate skill that entails the integration of a large amount of 
information, including the ability to make inferences about information not explicitly stated in the 
text and the “understanding of abstract concepts such as characters‟ underlying motivations” 
(Lynch et al., 2008, p. 350).  
The results of the present investigation also enrich our understanding of the early aspects of 
the development of narrative comprehension. Although it has been argued that “many of the 
foundational abilities that contribute to children‟s comprehension of stories emerge in their oral 
language comprehension in advance of their learning to read”, the antecedents of reading 
comprehension, and particularly children‟s comprehension of oral stories, have been overlooked in 
studies of young children‟s developing literacy skills (Skarakis-Doyle & Dempsey, 2008, p. 131). 
As a result, it has also been argued that studies of these precursory narrative comprehension 
abilities are very much needed if we are to gain a fuller understanding of how literacy and narrative 
comprehension skills develop (Lynch et al., 2008). The results of the present investigation offer 
insight into one possible precursory aspect of narrative comprehension, namely the simulation of 







As mentioned earlier, simulation offers a compelling account of how it is that reading a story 
affords us the privilege of experiencing the perspective of another person, place, or time. If, as 
speculated, the simulation of narrative events is central to the comprehension of narratives, then 
one would expect to find evidence of this ability in young children and prior to the emergence of 
reading ability.  Discovering any indication that preliterate children simulate narrative events 
during comprehension would support an argument that simulation is indeed a fundamental 
component of comprehension and a possible important antecedent to reading comprehension.  
The results of the present investigation suggest that children as young as three years of age do 
indeed simulate narrative events, and specifically a narrative character‟s movements through space 
and time. These findings therefore suggest that the simulation of narrative events may be a 
fundamental and critical component of narrative comprehension.  
The present investigation also extends our understanding of mental simulation of narrative 
events by contributing to our understanding of the role that listeners‟ expectations play in their 
simulations. Scholars have argued that expectations enable readers to anticipate how a narrative 
will unfold (Rapp et al., 2006). Although research suggests that adult readers‟ expectations exert an 
influence over a variety of narrative comprehension processes including simulations (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 1983; Rapp et al., 2006; Rapp & Taylor, 2004; Zwaan, 1994), little is known about 
how children‟s expectations might influence their simulations of narrative events. The results of 
the present investigation suggest that children‟s expectations about the duration of certain activities 





In Study 1 children‟s simulations of a character‟s movements were influenced by their 
expectations about the duration of particular physical activities (i.e., walking vs. driving). In 
Studies 2 and 3, children‟s simulations of a character‟s movements were also influenced by 
children‟s expectations about the influence of certain motivating psychological factors (i.e., 
eagerness to get to a particular location). These findings lend support to the argument that 
simulations “…share certain „physical‟ characteristics with its real world counterpart” (Stanfield & 
Zwaan, 2001, p. 153) and that “any transformation the referent undergoes should cause an 
analogous transformation in the simulation” (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001, p. 153; Barsalou, 1999). 
The results of the present investigation demonstrate that children‟s simulations of a character‟s 
movements did indeed reflect real world characteristics and underwent analogous transformations 
(e.g., processing times increased when the character was driven as opposed to walked to his aunt‟s 
house). 
The results of the present investigation also contribute to our understanding of how movement 
is represented in narratives. As any movement always entails the passing of time, tracking a 
character‟s movement requires a representation of both space and time. The present investigation is 
the first to explore children‟s mental representations of the combined influence of these two 
dimensions. Given that adults judge distances between moving entities and landmarks as greater 
when the moving entity is believed to be moving quickly than when the entity is believed to be 
moving slowly (e.g., Morrow & Clark, 1988), it may not seem surprising that children take longer 
to mentally “move” from one place to another when the character is described as walking as 
opposed to being driven.  However, what makes the results of the present investigation especially 





scenery and preparatory sentences) did not explicitly communicate the speed of a character‟s 
movement. These findings lend support to other studies, albeit with adults, suggesting that mental 
simulation of motion is not limited to explicit descriptions of motion but rather generalizes to 
implicit types of descriptions of motion such as, for instance, those expressed in fictive or 
figurative thought and language (Matlock, 2004). The results of the three studies comprising the 
presented investigation suggest that even preliterate children are capable of inferring the implied 
speed of a character‟s movements. 
Function of Narrative 
Scholars believe that storytelling and narratives emerged in the Pleistocene. Such an early 
emergence suggests that narrative is sufficiently old to be considered a product of natural selection. 
Thus, on a final, albeit very speculative note, it may be worthwhile to revisit the issue of narrative 
function and specifically of the value of narratives, and the particular benefits that stories and 
storytelling confer on our species.   
Many scholars agree that narratives and narrative cognition are an important aspect of our 
daily functioning. The cognitive literary theorist Mark Turner (2001) argues that narrative 
organizes the whole of human experience, including life stories of the past as well as life stories as 
they unfold. To psychologist Jerome Bruner, narrative represents one of the most fundamental 
means by which we come to understand the world. As Bruner (1990, p. 97) states, “our capacity to 
render experience in terms of narrative is not just child‟s play, but an instrument for making 
meaning that dominates much of life in culture.”   
Several other scholars have argued that the importance and benefit of stories is that they 





Sugiyama has argued that “narrative may be characterized as a simulation of experience – a set of 
representations of the human physical, social, and mental environment – from which conclusions 
about the real world may be drawn” (Sugiyama, 2001a, p. 224). More recently, Mar and Oatley 
(2008) have also stressed the notion that narratives function as a form of simulation, although he 
primarily focuses on the social function of such simulations. If stories are a means by which we 
experience and simulate important aspects of our daily lives, the question then becomes: how does 
the brain enable narratives to serve this very important function?  
The important role that simulations of narrative events play in comprehension has continued 
to gain support from a growing number of studies demonstrating that simulations are an integral 
part of narrative comprehension. Many of these studies were discussed in the introduction to the 
present investigation but, briefly, research suggests that during comprehension adults build a rich 
detailed mental representation of a narrative and that in doing so vicariously experience that which 
they read. This claim is supported by numerous behavioural and neuroimaging findings 
demonstrating that readers mentally simulate a story‟s perceptual and motoric elements (e.g., 
Brunyé et al., 2009; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Glenberg, 2007). Findings that adults simulate 
narrative events offer an explanation of how the brain enables narratives to function as a virtual 
reality that enables humans to acquire and practice useful knowledge and skills without 
undertaking the risks of first-hand experience.  
 
Methodological Contributions and Future Directions 
The processing time methodology developed to carry out the present investigation offers an 





comprehension questions. Investigating children‟s story comprehension using a response-time 
based approach may prove especially useful in the study of individual differences and especially in 
those observed in children with specific reading difficulties.  
Specific reading difficulties are estimated to occur among 10% of typically developing 7- to 
10-year-old children (e.g., Nation, 2007; Nation & Snowling, 1997; Stothard & Hulme, 1992; Yuill 
& Oakhill, 1991). These children have been classified as poor comprehenders, meaning that, 
despite age appropriate general language ability and decoding skills, they experience problems 
comprehending written and oral language. Because of their proficient general language ability, 
these children are seldom encountered in clinical settings, and for that reason their struggles are 
often overlooked (Nation, 2007).  
Although several types of cognitive deficits have been investigated to account for specific 
reading comprehension difficulties (see Cain & Oakhill, 2007 or Nation, 2007 for review), these 
efforts have generally served to rule out plausible explanations (e.g., working memory deficits, 
inference making). Thus to date, precursors of specific reading comprehension difficulties remain 
elusive, as do remedies for comprehension problems (Nation, 2007). Indeed, experts in the field of 
reading comprehension have stressed that “long-term longitudinal studies are needed if we are to 
understand better the precursors to, and consequences of, „specific‟ difficulties with reading 
comprehension” (Nation, 2007, p. 265).  
One possible cognitive contributor to specific reading comprehension difficulties may be 
children‟s ability to create detailed situation models of narratives. Recent findings from studies 
conducted with school-aged children who are poor readers have led to the suggestion that their 





et al., 2004; Nation, 2005). Consequently, an investigation of this potential precursor of specific 
reading comprehension difficulty is very much warranted. The story listening task used in the 
present investigation may offer a unique and less taxing means of investigating these types of 
comprehension difficulties in young children. From a theoretical perspective, an exploration of the 
ability to construct coherent situation models of narratives in children who are struggling to 
comprehend has the potential to advance scientific understanding in numerous domains, including 
narrative development and developmental cognition. From a practical and potential policy 
perspective, research on the relation between early story comprehension difficulties and later 
reading performance has implications for the further understanding of basic reading 
comprehension processes within an everyday context.  
Conclusion 
The results of the three studies that make up the present investigation highlight the importance 
of considering, and further investigating, the development and role of mental simulation in 
narrative comprehension in young children. In particular, although it has been argued that narrative 
comprehension is a critical component of, and precursor to, the acquisition of reading ability, 
recent reviews have highlighted the need for studies directed at children‟s comprehension, rather 
than production, of narratives, especially among typically developing children (Lynch et al., 2008). 
By exploring one possible precursor of comprehension in young children, the present investigation 
addresses this need. Furthermore, the results of the present investigation offer new insights into the 
development and sophistication of narrative comprehension in preliterate children. The finding that 







 Equipment failure (n = 4) and an unwillingness to answer the questions (n = 2) 
resulted in the absence of this data for a total of 6 children over all 3 studies.  
2
Additional analyses, conducted for each of the three studies with a sample that 
included only the children who answered all of the story comprehension questions correctly, 
yielded no differences with respect to the significance of results of all analyses and thus the 
results reported here are include the full sample of children for all three studies.  
3
The reader may note that overall mean PTs are longer in the eager condition in Study 
3‟s drive condition than Study 3‟s walk condition, and in turn question the coherence of 
these findings with respect to Study 1. The reader should recall that the data from Study 3‟s 
walk and drive condition are from two different groups of children. Just as in adult studies 
assessing reading times, our hypotheses are not about absolute values of processing times 
that would hold across different groups of children, but rather about relative differences 
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Appendix A: Example of a Story used in Study 1 
 
Component 1: Introduction 
1. Jamie was at home playing in the playroom downstairs when her mom called to her and said, 
2. “Jamie. It‟s almost time to go.” 
3. “As soon as you‟re finished playing, we‟re going to visit aunt Alice.”  
4. “Ok, mom” said Jamie. 




 Movement Manipulation 
6. “You know what Jamie? This time, let‟s walk to aunt Alice‟s”. 
 
Component 3: Description of Scenery 
7. On the way to aunt Alice‟s, they saw some dogs in a park; 
8. And some kids playing baseball; 
9. And squirrels running around someone‟s yard; 
10. And even some kids sliding on a slide. 
 
Component 4: Visit 
11.  Aunt Alice lived all alone and sometimes needed help with the housework.  
12. When they got to aunt Alice‟s, they helped her plant flowers in the backyard. 
13. Jamie had a great time planting all the flowers. 
14. When they were all done, aunt Alice brought out some lemonade and sandwiches and 
afterwards Jamie had a Popsicle. 
15. But just when they were getting ready to go home, they heard a noise. 
16. “It sounds like a meow!” said Jamie. 
17. “Oh no! I think the neighbour‟s kitty is stuck in my tree” aunt Alice said. 
18. “Let‟s get it down” all three of them said, and Jamie‟s mom went to get a ladder. 
19. Then Jamie‟s mom climbed up the ladder and grabbed the scared kitty. 
20. Then they played with the kitty a bit, but soon it was time to go home. 





22. But when they got home, Jamie‟s mom realized that she forgot something at aunt Alice‟s. 
23. “Sorry, Jamie, but we have to go out again. I forgot my cell phone at aunt Alice‟s” said 
Jamie‟s mom.  




 Movement Manipulation 
25. “You know what Jamie? This time, let‟s drive to aunt Alice‟s”. 
 
Component 6: Description of Scenery 
26. On the way to aunt Alice‟s, they saw some ducks in the park; 
27. And some kids playing soccer; 
28. And birds flying around in someone‟s yard; 
29. And even some kids swinging on a swing. 
 
Component 7: Conclusion 
30. When they got to aunt Alice‟s, she was already waiting for them with the phone.  





Appendix B: Example of a Story used in Study 2 
Component 1: Story Introduction 
1. Jamie was at home playing when her mom called to her and said. 
2. “Jamie, it‟s time to get ready.” 
3. “As soon as you‟re finished changing your clothes/cleaning up the mess you made in the 
backyard we‟re going to the ice cream store/dentist” 
4. “Ok, mom” said Jamie. 
 
Component 2: Eagerness Manipulation 
5. Jamie thought that going to the ice cream store/dentist was really great/really horrible!  
 
Component 3: Preparatory Activities  
Changing clothes sequence of preparatory activities: 
6. Jamie walked over to her dresser. 
7. She put on her cool green t-shirt. 
8. Jamie put on her socks. 
9. She pulled on her favourite jeans. 
10. And finally, Jamie put on her bright red sweatshirt. 
11. Now Jamie was all ready to go. 
or 
Cleaning up mess in backyard sequence of preparatory activities: 
6. Jamie went outside. 
7. She picked up the blocks. 
8.  Jamie put the blocks in the bucket. 
9.  She picked up her ball. 
10. And finally, Jamie walked back in. 







Component 4: Adventure 
12. “Jamie, it‟s time to go” said Jamie‟s mom. 
13. Jamie and her mom drove to the ice cream store/dentist‟s office.  






Appendix C: Example of a Story used in Study 3 
Component 1: Introduction 
1. Jamie was at home playing in the playroom downstairs when her mom called to her and said, 
2. “Jamie. It‟s almost time to go.” 
3. “As soon as you‟re finished playing, we‟re going to visit aunt Alice.”  
4. “Ok, mom” said Jamie. 




 Movement Manipulation 




 Eagerness Manipulation 
7. “Jamie thought that going to visit aunt Alice‟s was really great.” 
 
Component 4: Description of Scenery 
8. On the way to aunt Alice‟s, they saw some dogs in a park; 
9. And some kids playing baseball; 
10. And squirrels running around someone‟s yard; 
11. And even some kids sliding on a slide. 
 
Component 5: Visit 
12. Aunt Alice lived all alone and sometimes needed help with the housework.  
13. When they got to aunt Alice‟s, they helped her plant flowers in the backyard. 
14. Jamie had a great time planting all the flowers. 
15. When they were all done, aunt Alice brought out some lemonade and sandwiches and 
afterwards Jamie had a Popsicle. 
16. But just when they were getting ready to go home, they heard a noise. 
17. “It sounds like a meow!” said Jamie. 





19. “Let‟s get it down” all three of them said, and Jamie‟s mom went to get a ladder. 
20. Then Jamie‟s mom climbed up the ladder and grabbed the scared kitty. 
21. Then they played with the kitty a bit, but soon it was time to go home. 
22. Then Jamie and her mom went home.  
23. But when they got home, Jamie‟s mom realized that she forgot something at aunt Alice‟s. 
24. “Sorry, Jamie but we have to go out again. I forgot my cell phone at aunt Alice‟s” said 
Jamie‟s mom.  




 Movement Manipulation 
26. “You know what Jamie? This time, let‟s walk to Aunt Alice‟s”. 
 
Component 7: 2nd Eagerness Manipulation 
27. “Jamie thought that going to visit aunt Alice‟s was really horrible.” 
 
Component 8: Description of Scenery 
28. On the way to aunt Alice‟s, they saw some ducks in the park; 
29. And some kids playing soccer; 
30. And birds flying around in someone‟s yard; 
31. And even some kids swinging on a swing. 
 
Component 7: Conclusion 
32. When they got to aunt Alice‟s, she was already waiting for them with the phone.  
33. Then Jamie and her mom went home to make dinner.  
 
 
